New Jersey's Other-Crimes Rule and the Evidence
Committee's Abrogation of Almost Two Hundred
Years of Judicial Precedent
INTRODUCTION*

The introduction of extrinsic evidence of a defendant's other
crimes, wrongs and acts is one of the most important and controversial means of proof in the resolution of criminal and civil disputes.' Even though extrinsic evidence of a defendant's other
* This Comment addresses the differences between the 1967 version of the New
Jersey Rules of Evidence and the newly adopted version. The former New Jersey
Rules of Evidence will be cited as "N.J. Evid. R." whereas the new rules presently in
effect will be cited as "N.J.R.E." See N.J.R.E. 1103, RICHARD J. BniN1o, CURREwr NEw
JERSEY RuLEs OF EVIDENCE

(1993-94).

1 Not surprisingly, the use of extrinsic evidence of other crimes has generated
both criticism and support from a great number of legal scholars. For criticism of the
other-crimes rule, see Susan M. Davies, Evidence of Characterto Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy, 27 CRnm. L. BuiL. 504, 534 (1991) (advocating the creation of
mandatory and discretionary standards to guide the trial court's balancing of the prejudice of other-crimes evidence against its probative value); Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Use of Evidence of an Accused's UnchargedMisconduct to Prove Mens Rea: The Doctrines
Which Threaten to Engulf the CharacterEvidence Prohibition, 51 Ono ST. LJ. 575, 580
(1990) (stating that when "deciding whether to infer the accused's subjective bad
character from the accused's uncharged crimes, at a subconscious level thejurors may
be tempted to punish the accused for the other crimes"); Richard B. Kuhns, The Propensity to Misunderstandthe Characterof Specific Acts Evidence, 66 IowA L. REV. 777, 803
(1981) (declaring that other-crimes evidence should be admitted with great caution);
Rule 404(b) Other Crimes Evidence: The Need for a Two-Step Analysis, 71 Nw. U. L. REV.
635, 644 (1976) (criticizing federal courts for failing to balance the prejudicial impact
of other-crimes evidence against its probative value); 3AJOHN H. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
IN TRtis AT COMMON LAw § 988, at 920-21 (3d ed. 1970) (observing that "It] he rumor of the misconduct, when admitted, goes far, in spite of all theory and of the
judge's charge, towards fixing the misconduct as a fact upon the other person, and
thus does.. . improper things, [such as] violat[ing] the fundamental right of fairness
that prohibits the use of such facts.").
For support of the other-crimes rule, see David Crump, How Should We Treat Character Evidence Offered To Prove Conduct?, 58 U. CoLo. L. REV. 279, 290, 291 (1987) (asserting that the existing other-crimes rule promotes efficiency in dispute resolution
and a rational search for truth and as a result, any future amendments to the rule
should be made cautiously).
The judicial system has traditionally held that principles of fairness and justice
are integral elements of American criminal jurisprudence. See Glen Weissenberger,
Making Sense of Extrinsic Act Evidence: FederalRule of Evidence 404(b), 70 IowA L. REv.
579, 583 n.17 (1985) (citation omitted). Particularly, the United States Constitution's
protections against self-incrimination and double jeopardy, prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment and the guarantee of a speedy trial are prime examples of
this concern for fairness and justice. See U.S. CoNST. amends. V, VI, and VIII. In New
Jersey, Fifth Amendment guarantees have been adopted by statute. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A-84A-19 (West 1960). Despite this concern for fairness and justice, one legal com-

394

COMMENT
mentator has recognized that "[t]he American rules of character evidence today do
little credit to a profession priding itself on realistic and sensible standards to encourage the production of justice from the process of litigation." Richard Uviller,
Evidence Of CharacterTo Prove Conduct: Illusion, illogic And InjusticeIn The Courtroom, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 845, 880 (1982).
Although the use of a defendant's other crimes has an unparalleled prejudicial
impact upon the resolution of criminal cases, its use is still permitted. See Kuhns,
supra, at 778 n.4. It is well documented, Kuhns stated, that evidence of other crimes
may cause undue surprise to defendants who may be unprepared to rebut evidence of
a remote crime. Id. The use of other-crimes evidence, Kuhns added, also seems to be
contrary to the notion that a convicted defendant "has paid his debt to society." Id. A
further concern, the commentator noted, is the possibility that the jury may overvalue
the probative worth of other-crimes evidence. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court
Committee on Evidence explained that other-crimes evidence has such a highly biasing impact that:
[A] jury [may] well exaggerate the value of such evidence as proving that,
because the defendant has committed a similar crime before, it might
properly be inferred that he committed this one; conclude that the defendant deserves punishment because he is a general wrongdoer even if
the prosecution has not established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt...
[and determine] that because the defendant is a criminal, the evidence
put in on his behalf should not be believed ....
REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY SuPREME COURT CoMMrrrEE ON EVIDENCE 102 (1963)
[hereinafter 1963 REPORT]. See also EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Need To Amend Federal
Rule Of Evidence 404(b): The Threat To The Future Of The Federal Rules Of Evidence, 30
ViL. L. REv. 1465, 1470 (1985) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Need to Amend] (noting that
psychological studies reveal that other-crimes evidence has a highly biasing impact on
jurors, leading to devastating consequences for criminal defendants). But see Marshall
McKusick, Technique In Proof Of Other Crimes To Show Guilty Knowledge And Intent, 24
IOWA L. REv. 471, 473 (1939) (arguing that the State is not always guaranteed a fair
trial because judges may be naturally "inclined to rule favorably to the accused on any
close question of evidence knowing that, if the jury by their verdict acquit the accused, he cannot be reversed on an error committed by his ruling").
Moreover, the introduction of other-crimes evidence results in a time-consuming
process that further overburdens the judicial system. Comment, Other Crimes Evidence
At Triak Of BalancingAnd Other Matters, 70 YALE L.J. 763, 763 n.2 (1961) [hereinafter
Balancing]. Not surprisingly, the conflict between safeguarding the rights of criminal
defendants and the State's pressing need for the other-crimes evidence has been described as generating as many cases in federal courts as the "sands of the sea." Mc,
ComIcK ON EVIDENCE § 190, at 558 n.8 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984). This
conflict is highlighted by the fact that although other-crimes evidence is often excluded at trial, such evidence is heavily relied upon when arresting and charging criminal defendants. ProceduralProtections Of The CriminalDefendant"A Reevaluation Of The
PrivilegeAgainst Self-IncriminationAnd The Rule Excluding Evidence Of Propensity To Commit Crime, 78 HARv. L. REv. 426, 436 (1964) [hereinafter Procedural].
In the context of civil disputes, New Jersey courts have not clearly defined what
constitutes a "civil wrong." N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 1, RiciAn J. BiuNaNo, NEW JERSEY
RuLEs OF EVDENCE (1993) (concluding that civil wrongs may include torts, "quasicriminal and intentional acts of misconduct"). The admissibility of other civil wrongs
is most often raised in cases of negligence and products liability. McCoRMiCK, supra,
§ 200, at 587. In products liability disputes, the majority view is to limit the admissibility of other torts. EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, UnchargedMisconduct Evidence: GettingIt Out
into the Ligh4 20 TRIAL 58, 58 (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter Uncharged]. To admit other
torts as evidence in a civil trial at common law, the other tort must have occurred
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crimes 2 generally has tremendous probative value, its potential for
misleading and confusing the jury has led to a general rule limiting
its use.3 Recognizing the importance of such evidence, courts have
under notably analogous circumstances to the tort being alleged. Id. at 59-60. Most
modem courts have retained this stringent common law rule for the admissibility of a
defendant's other torts. Id. at 60. Nevertheless, in products liability cases, courts have
allowed evidence of a defendant's other torts to prove causation or the dangerous
qualities of a product. Id. at 59. In negligence cases, evidence of other accidents may
also be admitted to prove a defective physical condition, the conditions that led to the
injury or the danger created by the defendant's conduct McCoRMICr, supra, § 200, at
587-89. See, e.g., State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47, 59-60, 424 A.2d 1182, 1188-89
(App. Div. 1980) (admitting evidence of a defendant's previous accidents to demonstrate prior knowledge of his incapacity to drive). But see Temperance Hall Ass'n v.
Giles, 33 N.J.L. 260, 264 (Sup. Ct. 1869) (excluding evidence, in a slip and fall action,
to show that thousands of people had walked by a sidewalk without injury). In general, the use of evidence of other accidents still remains more limited than the admission of a defendant's other crimes. Uncharged, supra, at 60.
2 The scope of the other-crimes rule, as interpreted by the New Jersey judiciary,
extends to four circumstances: (1) crimes for which the defendant has been charged
but not convicted; (2) convictions pending appeal; (3) acquitted offenses; and (4)
uncharged offenses. HON. R. KEVIN McGRoRY, TRIAL LAwYERs GUME TO EVIDENCE
LAW 192 (1992) (citations omitted).
3 See State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580, 585, 444 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Law Div.
1982). The other-crimes rule is part of the rule of res inter alios acta. McKusick, supra
note 1, at 471. BLAc 's LAw DIcIONARY defines res inter alios acta as:
[A] thing or event which occurs at a time different from the time in issue
is generally not admissible to prove what occurred at the time in issue.
Also events which involve those not parties to an action are generally
not admissible because they are immaterial and commonly not relevant.
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (6th ed. 1990).
Generally, courts have adopted one of two approaches to govern the admissibility
of other-crimes evidence. See Kuhns, supra note 1, at 780. First, the inclusionary approach allows the introduction of other-crimes evidence "for all purposes except to
prove character to show action in conformity." Id. (emphasis in original). The federal other-crimes rule has adopted this approach. Id. at 781. But see Jennifer Y.
Schuster, Uncharged Misconduct Under Rule 404(b): The Admissibility of Inextricably Intertwined Evidence, 42 U. MLivAi L. RE,. 947, 959 (1988) (stating that the federal othercrimes rule may be both inclusionary and exclusionary).
The second or exclusionary approach customarily prohibits the use of other
crimes unless "they are relevant for some specifically designated non-character purpose, such as to prove motive, identity, or intent." Kuhns, supra note 1, at 780. One
commentator, however, has criticized this approach for failing to balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact. Id. Strict adherence to the
exclusionary rule may also lead to two types of errors: (1) highly probative evidence
which is not unduly harmful to the defendant may be excluded because it fails to
comply with one of the permissible purposes, and (2) evidence that falls within one of
the permissible purposes may be admitted despite being highly prejudicial. Balancing,
supra note 1, at 768. In contrast to its federal counterpart, the New Jersey othercrimes rule has undoubtedly adopted the exclusionary approach. N.J. Evid. R. 55
cmt. For the complete text of Rule 55, see infra note 52.
The primary reason for adopting an exclusionary other-crimes rule is the weakness of the jury system. Procedural supra note 1, at 450. This is obvious because even
relevant evidence is often withheld from the jury due to its highly biasing impact. See
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struggled to balance the probative value of other-crimes evidence
with an individual's right to a fair trial.4 This is of special importance in criminal trials where evidence of other crimes is admissible for purposes other than proving the defendant's character or
propensity for misconduct.5 Among these other permissible purposes for admitting other-crimes evidence are identity, motive,
preparation, plan and intent.6 To counter the prejudicial impact
that other-crimes evidence has on the jury, trial judges often must
issue limiting instructions explaining the purposes for the introduction of such evidence. 7 Thus, an improper or inadequate limiting instruction may be grounds for reversal if likely to lead to an
unjust result.'
Shari S. Diamond, et al., Blindfolding The Juy, 52 LAw & CowNEMp. PaoBs. 247, 250
(1989). Moreover, psychological studies have revealed that jurors exposed to a criminal defendant's other crimes convict defendants at a higher rate than when such evidence was excluded. See Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of
Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use PriorConviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAw &
HuM. BEHAv. 37, 39 (1985). Undoubtedly, the adoption of different approaches will
have an impact on the outcome of a case. Balancing,supranote 1, at 767. Regardless
of which of the two approaches is adopted, however, the balancing process remains
the "chief barrier against the use of prejudicial other crimes evidence." Id. at 769.
4 See generally supra note 1 (discussing courts' difficulty in balancing the need for
other-crimes evidence against the prejudicial impact of the evidence).
5 McCoRmicr, supra note 1, § 190, at 557-58. Character is customarily defined as
the set of characteristics that relate to an individual's morality. Kuhns, supranote 1, at
779. For a discussion the distinction between character and propensity, see infra note
172.
Based on character evidence's potentially devastating impact on the resolution of
criminal cases, the New Jersey other-crimes rule broadly prohibits the admission of
other-crimes evidence that would implicate the defendant's predisposition to engage
in criminal conduct. See N.J. Evid. R. 55. Enmeshed in the rationale of this rule is the
idea that a defendant's predisposition to commit a crime cannot be the only basis for
conviction. State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 220, 432 A.2d 912, 920 (1981). There are,
however, instances where a defendant's other crimes may be used to prove collateral
matters enumerated in the rule. See generally McCoRamic, supra note 1, § 190, at 55864 (providing a comprehensive list of the proper use of other-crimes evidence).
6 N.J.R.E. 404(b). For the text of the newly enacted NewJersey other-crimes rule,
see infra note 165.
7 In curbing the impact of highly prejudicial evidence, limiting instructions have
significantly "simplifie [d] judicial administration by reducing the number of mistrials,
new trials, and reversals for prejudice." Balancing supra note 1, at 765. See generally
Michael H. Graham, Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Curative, Cautionary and
Limiting Instructions, 17 Cium. L. BuLL. 147, 147-49 (1981) [hereinafter Instructions]
(discussing the three types of limiting instructions: first, curative instructions, which
seek to attenuate the impact that improperly admitted evidence may have on the jury;
second, cautionary instructions, which are issued contemporaneously with the introduction of the evidence; third, limiting instructions, which are issued at the end of
the trial "as part of the general process of instructing the jury upon the law").
8 See N.J. C. R. 2:10-2 (1992); see also State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 405, 526 A.2d
1077, 1082 (1987) (reversing a criminal conviction based on the limiting instructions'
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Part I of this Comment explores the initial development of the
New Jersey common law propensity rule from the early nineteenth
century until its codification in 1967. Part II examines the
problems encountered in the application of former New Jersey
Rule of Evidence 55 and the corresponding judicial attempts to
resolve these problems. Part III scrutinizes newly adopted New
Jersey Evidence Rule 404(b) and its potential impact upon the resolution of criminal disputes where other crimes are offered in evidence against the accused. This Comment concludes that this new
rule would exacerbate the substantive problems of the former rule
and create confusion for New Jersey attorneys, in particular those
who practice in both state and federal courts.
I.

THE NEW JERSEY COMMON LAW PROPENSIrY RuLE

In the area of other-crimes evidence, New Jersey, similar to
many other states, traditionally followed the precedent established
under English common law.' The English common law rule regarding the admissibility of a defendant's other crimes originated
in the eighteenth century and was compiled in the works ofJeremy
Bentham."° This early other-crimes rule barred evidence of a defendant's other crimes only when directly connected to the defendant's character.11 Thus, evidence of a defendant's other crimes was
potential for "producing an unjust result"). To curb the prejudicial impact of othercrimes evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court has mandated that trial courts issue
limiting instructions which clearly distinguish the permissible inferences from the impermissible inferences that may be drawn from other-crimes evidence. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 341, 605 A.2d 230, 236 (1992).
Limiting instructions have a definite effect on the outcome of the trial. See Balancing, supra note 1, at 765. As a result, when the trial court's failure to issue limiting
instructions affects a party's substantial rights, the admission of other-crimes evidence
may result in reversible error. See NJ. CT. R. 1:7-5 (1992). Legal commentators have
questioned the effectiveness of limiting instructions issued after the introduction of
other crimes. See, e.g., Balancing, supra note 1, at 765 (asserting that limiting instructions do not direct the jury's attention to the permissible uses of the defendant's
other crimes); Edward J. Imwinkelried, Limiting Instructions on Uncharged Misconduct
Evidence: The Last Line of Defense AgainstJury Misuse of the Evidence, TRIAL DIPLOMACYJ.
23, 26 (1985) [hereinafter Limiting Instructions] (stating that "even the best contemporary limiting instructions on uncharged misconduct do not guarantee that the jury
will use uncharged misconduct evidence properly").
9 SeeJulius Stone, The Rule Of Exclusion Of Similar Fact Evidence: America, 51 HARv.
L. REv. 988, 991 (1938).
10 See Thomas J. Reed, Trial By Propensity:Admission Of Other CriminalActs In Federal
Criminal Trials, 50 U. CIN. L. REv. 713, 719 (1981). Bentham recognized that
"[e]vidence of bad character incriminating the defendant, ought not be admitted, unless and insofar as it results in evidence admissible on other grounds. ... " Id. at 720
(citation omitted).
11 Stone, supra note 9, at 990. See generally Julius Stone, The Rule Of Exclusion Of
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admissible when relevant to other collateral matters in the case. 12
The principal American case dealing with the introduction of
other-crimes evidence was State v. Van Houten, a New Jersey case."
In Van Houten, the defendant was charged with falsifying a ten dollar note and using the note to purchase a pair of gloves. 4 The
NewJersey Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence showing that earlier that same night the defendant had used forged
notes to pay for other expenses.' 5 These purchases, the court explained, were admitted to prove that the defendant knew the notes
were counterfeit.1 6 Before admitting evidence of the other crime,
the court stressed, a connection between the other crime and the
charged crime would have to be found.' 7
The Van Houten court, however, failed to establish the parameters governing the admissibility of other-crimes evidence, instead
relying on the English common law to fill the vacuum.1 8 Despite
this refusal, the Van Houten court's focus on this "connection" re-

quirement was significant because it evinced an early concern with
the relevance of other-crimes evidence. 9 The Van Houten decision
appears to have laid the foundation for the subsequent developSimilarFactEvidence: England,46 HARv. L. REv. 954 (1932-33) (giving a comprehensive
account of the development of the English common law other-crimes rule) [hereinafter England].
12 England, supra note 11, at 965.
13 3 N.J.L. 248 (1810); Stone, supra note 9, at 993; see also Reed, supra note 10, at
721 (proclaiming the Van Houten decision as the genesis of the American judicial
system's involvement with other-crimes evidence).
14 Van Houten, 3 N.J.L. at 248-49.
15 Id. at 249-50. The defendant used forged notes to pay for small expenses for
which he could have used the cash in his possession. Id. at 249. Additionally, the
defendant visited several stores in Trenton, New Jersey, where he purchased articles
using falsified bills, receiving the difference in cash. Id. at 249-50.
16 Id. at 250.
17 Stone, supra note 9, at 994. The Van Houten court reasoned that the defendant's
other purchases with counterfeit notes were sufficiently connected to the charged
crime. See Van Houten, 3 N.J.L. at 250. First, the court explained, the other crimes
were committed at approximately the same time as the charged crime. Id. at 249.
Second, the Van Houten court added, the exchanges involving the counterfeit notes
all occurred while the defendant was in possession of a substantial amount of cash.
Id. Third, for every purchase the defendant effectuated using the forged notes, the
court noted, he received the difference in cash. Id. at 249-50. Justice Pennington
best summarized the opinion when he asserted that the defendant's other criminal
acts were properly admitted to show the defendant's knowledge. Id. at 250. One
justice dissented from the majority's determination. Id. (Kirkpatrick, J., dissenting).
Justice Kirkpatrick, however, did not write an opinion stating the basis of his dissent.
Id.
18 See Stone, supra note 9, at 991, 994. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying
text for an explanation of the English common law other-crimes rule.
19 See Stone, supra note 9, at 994.
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ment of NewJersey's other-crimes rule, while setting in motion the
evolution of the American Rule governing the admissibility of
other-crimes evidence. 0
New Jersey courts continued to follow the English common
law without question for more than a quarter century until the decision of State v. Robinson and Chittenden.2 1 In Robinson, the defendant was convicted of falsifying a five dollar bank note by altering its
place of origination.2 2 To demonstrate guilty knowledge despite
the defendant's acquittal of a previous crime, the Robinson court
permitted extrinsic evidence of another note falsified in a similar
fashion and passed by the defendant. 2 Notwithstanding the defendant's acquittal, the New Jersey Supreme Court reasoned that
evidence of similar indictable acts, close in time to the charged
offense, was admissible to show guilty knowledge. 24 Thus, the
20 See State v. Robinson, 16 N.J.L. 507, 508 (1838) (describing the Van Houten decision as having established the precedent regarding the admissibility of other-crimes
evidence); Stone, supra note 9, at 993-94 (discussing the American Rule's original
scope). The "original" American Rule generally excluded a defendant's other crimes
when relevant merely to his predisposition to commit crimes. Id. at 989. An exception to the "original" American Rule evolved, however, allowing other crimes to show
guilty knowledge in forgery cases and in cases where the defendant had acquired
stolen property. Id. at 990.
Thereafter, the "spurious rule" developed, which reviewed the admissibility of
other-crimes evidence by focusing on whether the evidence satisfied any of the permissible purposes that allow its use. Id. at 1004-05. The application of the "spurious
rule" has been problematic, however, because courts tend to focus on one specific
exception to the other-crimes rule and therefore overlook the other alternative exceptions for allowing the other-crimes evidence. Id. at 1022. For a complete discussion of the "spurious rule" and its development see id. at 1004-33.
21 16 N.J.L. 507 (1838); Stone, supra note 9, at 995. Like most early cases dealing
with the introduction of other-crimes evidence, Robinson dealt with the falsification of
a bank note. Id. at 993.
22 Robinson, 16 N.J.L. at 507, 509. The defendant had altered the place of origination on the bank bill by covering the word "Boston" with "New York" because the New
York bank was economically solvent. Id. at 509.
23 Id. at 508, 509. The defendant had used another two dollar note similarly falsified on the same day as the charged crime. Id. at 507.
24 Id. at 513 (Dayton, J., concurring). The court declared that the defendant's
acquittal of the first offense was irrelevant because "[t]he particular ground of his
acquittal, is not matter of record, it is matter of presumption only, wholly collateral to
the record; and mere presumption of a fact, is allowed to stand only till the fact itself
appears." Id. at 509. Moreover, the court rejected the defendant's contention that to
allow evidence of the other indictment would place him in double jeopardy because
the evidence was offered to show guilty knowledge and not as an independent basis
for his conviction. Id. The concurrence reasoned that although the probative value
of the other-crimes evidence may have been lessened by the defendant's acquittal, the
evidence remained valuable to show guilty knowledge. Id. at 513 (Dayton, J., concurring). Justice Dayton astutely summed up the other-crimes rule as one that admits
evidence of other crimes to prove a collateral issue, not as an additional cause of
action against the defendant. Id. at 514 (Dayton, J., concurring).
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court reaffirmed the Van Houten holding that there must be a connection between the other crime and the charged offense. 25
The Robinson decision illustrates that American courts comprehended the negative repercussions of strictly following the English
other-crimes rule. 26 The Robinson court recognized that the Van
Houten decision dictated the principles governing the admissibility
of other-crimes evidence in the state of New Jersey. 27 Although
Van Houten exclusively relied on English authorities, it is significant
that the Robinson court followed a compilation of the law as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme Court.28 Therefore, Robinson
marked the end of the period preceding 1840, during which American courts exclusively followed English precedent. 29
Fifty-three years after the Robinson decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court formulated a definitive other-crimes rule in the
landmark case, State v. Raymond."° In Raymond, the defendant was
convicted of arson."' On appeal, the defendant contended that
the trial court had improperly admitted evidence of other fires in
buildings in which he had an interest.3 2 The New Jersey Supreme
Court excluded the evidence of the other burned-down buildings,
reasoning that such evidence tended to show nothing more than
See id. at 508, 509; State v. Van Houten, 3 N.J.L. 248, 250 (1810).
Stone, supra note 9, at 988. In dictum, the Robinson court strongly criticized the
English tendency to exclude other crimes that implicated the defendant's character.
Robinson, 16 NJ.L. at 508-09; see Stone, supra note 9, at 996. Justice Ford, writing for
the majority, forcefully attacked an English decision, where a similar criminal act subject to indictment was held inadmissible. Robinson, 16 NJ.L. at 508 (citing Rex v.
Smith, 2 C.P. 633 (1827)). In Smith, the defendant was indicted for counterfeiting a
bank note, and the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of a second indictment against the defendant for falsifying another bank note to show defendant's
guilty knowledge. Smith, 2 C.P. at 633. Mr. Baron Vaughan, writing the opinion of the
court, stated that although "[o]ther utterings, for which no prosecution had been
commenced, have been held to be evidence to shew a guilty knowledge .... I am of
opinion, that if the prosecutors have made the second uttering the subject of a substantive charge, I cannot receive evidence of it in support of the present indictment."
Id. Following the English decision, Justice Ford declared, would be detrimental because evidence of other crimes would be admissible only if those crimes were not
subject to an indictment. Robinson, 16 N.J.L. at 508.
27 Robinson, 16 NJ.L. at 508.
28 See id.
29 Stone, supra note 9, at 991, 995.
30 53 N.J.L. 260, 21 A. 328 (1891); see Lewis Tyree, Evidence, 7 RuTGEiRs L. REv. 257,
261 (1952-53) (regarding Raymond as the leading NewJersey decision dealing with the
admissibility of other-crimes evidence).
31 Raymond, 53 N.J.L. at 261, 21 A. at 329.
32 Id. at 264, 21 A. at 329. The lower court's limiting instructions established that
the other fires were admissible to demonstrate that the charged fire had been initiated intentionally by the defendant in an attempt to commit fraud. Id., 21 A. at 32930.
25
26
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the defendant's propensity towards arson. 33
The Raymond court commenced its analysis by stating that the
defendant's guilt of other crimes was generally irrelevant in the
adjudication of guilt for the charged crime.34 Evidence of a defendant's other crimes, the court continued, was thus inadmissible
whenever the defendant's character was implicated.3 5 The court
held, however, that evidence of other crimes could be admissible
to show identity, opportunity, motive, intent, knowledge or preparation. 36 As in Van Houten, the Raymond court concluded that the
33 Id. at 266, 21
34 Id. at 264, 21
35 Id With this

A. at 330.
A. at 330.
assertion, the Raymond court established the exclusionary character of the other-crimes rule, which disallows evidence of a defendant's other crimes
because such evidence is irrelevant to resolution of the case. Id. Further expanding
on the rationale of the exclusionary rule, the Raymond court declared:
[I]t must not be supposed that the defendant's propensity to commit
crime, or even to commit crimes of the same sort as that charged, can
be put in evidence to prove his guilt of the particular offense; for however reasonable would be the deduction that, when a pocket is picked in
a group of persons, of whom only one is addicted to picking pockets, he
is the offender, his singularity in this respect could not, under our legal
theory, figure as proof of his guilt.
Id. at 265, 21 A. at 330. For an application of the exclusionary rule see State v. Nagy,
which stated that a defendant's other crime must be "so blended or connected with
the one on trial that proof of one incidentally involves the other; or explains the
circumstances thereof, or tends logically to prove any elements of the crime charged."
27 NJ. Super. 1, 11, 98 A.2d 613, 617-18 (App. Div. 1953).
36 Raymond, 53 N.J.L. at 264-65, 21 A. at 330. The Raymond decision has been heavily cited as one of the first cases establishing the parameters of the modem NewJersey
other-crimes rule. See, e.g., State v. Fisher, 96 NJ.L. 5, 8, 114 A. 247, 248 (1921) (citing Raymond as the case that promulgated the other-crimes rule); Nagy, 27 NJ. Super.
at 11, 98 A.2d at 618 (quoting Raymond as being one of the cases establishing the
guidelines, including the exceptions, of the common law other-crimes rule).
Drawing upon cases decided in the United States and England, the Raymond
court compiled the exceptions for which evidence of other crimes may be offered.
Raymond, 53 NJ.L. at 264-65, 21 A. at 330. The court ruled that other-crimes evidence
was admissible: whenever circumstantial evidence demonstrated that an individual
executed the two crimes, id. at 264, 21 A. at 330 (quoting Commonwealth v. Choate,
105 Mass. 451 (1870)); see also State v. Gibson, 92 NJ. Super. 397, 401, 223 A.2d 638,
640 (App. Div. 1966) (admitting evidence of a prior sale of narcotics to an undercover
agent to prove identity); where the defendant's commission of another unlawful act
indicated that he had the opportunity to commit the crime charged, Raymond, 53
NJ.L. at 264, 21 A. at 330 (quoting Regina v. Cobden, 3 Fost & F. 833 (1862)); see also
State v. Deliso, 75 NJ.L. 808, 816, 69 A. 218, 221 (1908) (allowing evidence of another
assault perpetrated by defendant in the nearby vicinity of the crime charged to show
the defendant's state of mind and that he had an opportunity to commit the charged
crime); where both crimes derived from a common motive aiming at the same goal,
Raymond, 53 NJ.L. at 264, 21 A. at 330 (quoting People v. Wood, 3 Park. Cr. Cas. 681
(1858)); see also State v. Attanasio, 92 NJ. Super. 267, 269-70, 223 A.2d 42, 43-44
(App. Div. 1966) (admitting evidence of prior payment from an employee to the defendant to secure his job to show "the defendant's course of dealing with [victim] and
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decision to admit the other crime into evidence would be based on
an examination of the other crime's connection with the charged
offense.37 In tune with this ruling, Justice Dixon, writing for the
majority, stressed the lack of a nexus between the charged fire and
the other previous fires.38 Nonetheless, the justice found that the
time lapse between the other fires and the indicted offense was not
dispositive, and focused instead on the lack of a factual link between the two offenses.3 9 Subsequently, this "connection" standard
defendant's scheme, motive and intent"); where the other crime showed intent or
knowledge of a specific occurrence, Raymond, 53 NJ.L. at 265, 21 A. at 330 (quoting
Queen v. Francis, 2 C.C.R. 612, 612 (1874)); see also State v. Fay, 127 N.J.L. 77, 83, 21
A.2d 607, 610 (1941) (allowing evidence of unlawful solicitation of votes by nearby
residents to prove that the defendant knowingly violated the election laws); when the
other crime denotes a motive for the crime charged, Raymond, 53 N.J.L. at 264-65, 21
A. at 330 (quoting Commonwealth v. Ferrigan, 44 Pa. 386 (1863)); see also State v.
Homer, 86 NJ. Super. 351, 364, 206 A.2d 905, 912 (App. Div. 1965) (allowing evidence of defendant's own drug addiction to show his motive for removing his
brother's dead body, who had died of an overdose); where the other crime was committed in preparation for the charged crime, Raymond, 53 N.J.L. at 265, 21 A. at 330
(quoting Rex v. Clewes, 4 Car. & P. 221 (1830)).
Finally, the Raymond court allowed evidence of a defendant's other crimes to
prove any other collateral matters, not enumerated, so long as the evidence did not
implicate the defendant's criminal character. Id. See, e.g., State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422,
433, 197 A.2d 185, 191 (1964) (introducing propensity evidence to rebut affirmative
defense of entrapment); State v. Sinnott, 24 N.J. 408, 413, 132 A.2d 298, 301 (1957)
(introducing evidence of a prior crime as part of the res gestae).
37 Raymond, 53 NJ.L. at 265, 21 A. at 330.
38 Id. at 265-66, 21 A. at 330. The Raymond court closely examined the defendant's
testimony about the causes of the previous fires and found that his explanations reasonably established his innocence. Id. at 264, 21 A. at 329; see also Tyree, supra note
30, at 261 (discussing the Raymond decision as excluding similar other crimes unconnected to the charged offense).
39 See Raymond, 53 NJ.L. at 265-66, 21 A. at 330. In assessing the connection between the charged offense and the other fires, the court observed that the previous
fires were between five and eleven years old and that there was no evidence to link
those fires to the charged fire. Id. Thus, the court declared, the other fires did not
rationally prove a component of the charged crime. Id. Specifically, the majority
asserted that "[t] here must appear, between the extraneous crime offered in evidence
and the crime of which the defendant is accused, some other real connection, beyond the
allegation that they have both sprung from the same vicious disposition." Id. at 265,
21 A. at 330 (emphasis added).
The unimportance of the temporal remoteness of other crimes was subsequently
examined in State v. Schuyler, where the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey
allowed evidence of a ten-year old dispute between the defendant and the victim to be
admitted. State v. Schuyler, 75 NJ.L. 487, 488, 68 A. 56, 57 (1907). Chief Judge
Gummere, writing for the majority, recognized:
Long-continued animosity and ill will are better evidence of a state of
mind which will ripen into deliberate murder than the hasty ebullition
of passion. The theory of the law of murder is that it is done upon
premeditation, and the motives for such an act are not less powerful
because they are the result of ill feelings entertained for years.
Id.; see also State v. Donohue, 2 NJ. 381, 388, 67 A.2d 152, 155-56 (1949) (admitting
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became an integral part of the New Jersey other-crimes rule.4 °
Recognizing that the connection standard was a component of
relevance, relevance eventually became the central criterion for
evaluating the admissibility of other-crimes evidence.41 In State v.
Noel, the defendant was indicted for and convicted of murdering a
taxi-cab driver.42 The investigation disclosed that the defendant
had kidnapped and murdered a little girl after killing the taxi
driver.43 The trial court admitted evidence of the girl's kidnapping
as relevant to show the defendant's motive for killing the taxi
driver. 4" On appeal, the defendant challenged the admission of
the child's abduction and murder.45
The Noel court intimated that the child's kidnapping and murder was insignificant because the offense occurred subsequent to
the charged offense.' Writing the opinion of the court, Justice
Katzenbach acknowledged that other-crimes evidence typically involved a defendant's prior crimes leading up to the charged offense.47 Despite this recognition, the Noel court highlighted the
probative value of the subsequent uncharged crime because it os48
tensibly revealed the defendant's motive for the charged murder.
Additionally, the court noted, the charged offense had been com49
mitted pursuant to a plan and in preparation of the other crime.
evidence of prior altercations between the victim and the defendant that occurred
nine years prior to trial because they logically proved an element of the charged
crime).
40 See, e.g., State v. Roscus, 16 N.J. 415, 422, 109 A.2d 1, 4 (1954) (allowing evidence of defendant's prior shooting because "the former crime [was] so related to the
crime charged as to time, place and circumstances that state of mind may be said to
be continuous"); State v. Lederman, 112 N.J.L. 366, 372, 373, 170 A. 652, 654, 655
(1934) (admitting evidence of the defendant's attack on the victim three days prior to
the murder); State v. Girone, 91 N.J.L. 498, 500, 103 A. 803, 804 (1918) (admitting
evidence that the defendant and the minor victim had previously cohabitated in another state as part of "a series of acts evincing a continuous state of mind"); State v.
Bloom, 89 N.J.L. 418, 420-21, 99 A. 125, 126 (1916) (excluding the defendant's prior
rapes as irrelevant in view of the lack of any "logical relation" with the charged offense); Bullock v. State, 65 N.J.L. 557, 575, 47 A. 62, 68 (1900) (excluding evidence of
a similar violent act because it "had no connection whatever with the charge for which
the prisoner was on trial").
41 See State v. Noel, 102 N.J.L. 659, 133 A. 274 (1926).
42 Id. at 660, 133 A. at 275.
43 Id. at 663, 133 A. at 276.
44 Id. at 672, 133 A. at 280.
45 Id., 133 A. at 279-80. The court of errors and appeals reversed the defendant's
conviction because the defendant's insanity impaired his capacity to understand fully
the magnitude of the crime he had committed. Id. at 678-79, 133 A. at 282.
46 See id. at 672, 133 A. at 280.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. First, the court reasoned that the killing of the taxi driver demonstrated that
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Although recognizing that other-crimes evidence has high
probative worth, the danger of its prejudicial impact compelled
New Jersey courts to promulgate a strong exclusionary policy. 50
Keeping in mind the higher probative value required of subsequent crime evidence, the New Jersey Supreme Court, however,
has consistently allowed its admission. 51
II.

THE APPLICATION OF RuLE 55

With this groundwork in place, New Jersey codified and
adopted Evidence Rule 55 in September of 1967.52 The Supreme
the defendant had a plan because whenever "two or more crimes [are] so related to
each other that proof of one tends to establish the other, evidence thereof is admissible, and such evidence does not fall under the condemnation of testimony relative to
other offenses than the one for which the defendant is on trial." Id. (quoting People
v. Molineux, 168 N.Y. 264 (1901)). Second, the court posited, such evidence demonstrated the defendant's motive in committing the charged offense. Id. The court
explained that the defendant calculated that he would have to kill the taxi driver to
obtain a car for the subsequent kidnapping of the child. Id.
50 See State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 299-300, 558 A.2d 833, 838-39 (1989) (citations
omitted).
The NewJersey Supreme Court defined the common law rule as the balancing of
two competing interests:
[O]n the one hand that other acts, because they cast light on propensities and thence on the issues, may always be fully explored; on the
other hand that other acts must be absolutely excluded because of the
prejudice, confusion, and surprise their use would create. The common law accepted neither extreme. It rejected the former; it only
adopted the latter subject to the all-important reservation that if other
acts were relevant to guilt of the crime charged otherwise than merely
through propensity, then those acts might like any other relevant facts
be explored.
Id. (quoting Stone, supra note 9, at 1033-34).
51 See, e.g., State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 330, 605 A.2d 230, 231 (1992) (admitting
evidence of a subsequent illegal drug sale to show the defendant's constructive possession of drugs in the charged sale); Stevens, 115 N.J. at 296-97, 558 A.2d at 837 (admitting a prior and a subsequent crime to show the defendant's continuous state of
mind). Federal courts have also endorsed the insignificance of the sequence of
events to the relevance of the evidence. See United States v. Moschiano, 695 F.2d 236,
244 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983) (ruling that a
defendant's subsequent crimes are admissible under proper circumstances).
To be admissible as evidence, the subsequent unlawful act must be logically relevant to a substantive issue. See EDwARDJ. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUrCr EVIDENCE § 2:11, at 32-33 (Cum. Supp. 1993). Generally, subsequent acts are admissible
to show identity, knowledge, intent and motive, and to rebut the affirmative defense
of entrapment. Id. at 33. But see Norman Krivosha, et al., Relevancy: The Necessary
Element in Using Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Bad Acts to Convict, 60 NEB. L. REV.
657, 672-73 (1981) (stating that allowing subsequent uncharged acts to prove a prior
preparation or plan "defies both reason and logic").
52 N.J. Evid. R. 55. Generally, the admissibility of other-crimes evidence is assessed
by applying four evidence rules. First, the evidence must be relevant to an issue in
dispute. Cofied, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A.2d at 235. The determination as to whether a
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piece of evidence is relevant was guided by former Rule 1(2), which set forth the
definition of relevance as "having a tendency in reason to prove any material fact,"
and former Rule 7(f), which established the inclusionary nature of rules dealing with
relevant evidence by stating that "all relevant evidence is admissible." NJ. Evid. R.
1(2), 7(f).
Second, the evidence must be introduced for a purpose other than to show the
defendant's criminal predisposition. N.J. Evid. R. 55. Rule 55 states:
Subject to Rule 47, evidence that a person committed a crime or civil
wrong on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his disposition to
commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that he committed a crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but, subject
to Rule 48, such evidence is admissible to prove some other fact in issue
including motive, intent, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Id.
Third, the probative worth of the evidence had to outweigh its biasing effect. N.J.
Evid. R. 4. Specifically, Rule 4 provided:
The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission
will either (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury.
Id.
Finally, the use of other-crimes evidence had to be accompanied by proper limiting instructions. N.J. Evid. R. 6. Rule 6 mandated that "[w]hen relevant evidence is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose and is inadmissible as to other parties or
for another purpose, the judge shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly." Id.
The federal system, on the other hand, codified its other-crimes rule, Federal
Rule 404(b), in 1975. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (1975) (amended 1991). Like the New
Jersey evidence system, other-crimes evidence sought to be introduced in federal
courts must pass a four prong test. First, under Federal Rule 401, relevant evidence is
defined as "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence." FED. R Evm. 401. Additionally, Federal Rule 402
states that: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. Evm. 402.
Second, Federal Rule 404(b) states that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the
accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EvrD. 404(b).
Thirdly, Federal Rule 403, the balancing rule, provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considera-
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Court Committee on Evidence anticipated that the codified Rule
55 would not cover all relevant areas.5" The Committee also noted
that the development of the many permissible purposes for which
other-crimes evidence could be offered might unfold as a potential
source of abuse in practice. 54 Furthermore, according to the Committee, resolving the tensions between the prosecutor's need for
other-crimes evidence and the defendant's right to a fair trial was a
major concern. 55 The trial judge was thus entrusted with the task
of excluding relevant other-crimes evidence, to the extent possible,
without frustrating the prosecutor's case.56 Striking a balance between these two competing interests may be one of the main justifications for preserving the other-crimes rule.5 7
In view of the highly prejudicial impact of a defendant's other
crimes, the level of proof required to show the occurrence of other
crimes became a major concern, and was later resolved in State v.
Wi/son. - 8 In Wilson, the defendant was convicted of the second de6
gree murder of her two-month old baby.5 9 At the Rule 8 hearing, 0
tions of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
FED. R. Evm. 403.
Lastly, Federal Rule 105 governs the issuance of limiting instructions and mandates that: "When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but
not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon
request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." FED. R. Evm. 105.
53 1963 REPORT, supra note 1, at 104.
54 Id. at 103. The report asserted that "[i]t is extremely difficult to prevent a determined and imaginative prosecutor from getting in evidence of other crimes." Id. (citation omitted). The New Jersey Supreme Court Committee on Evidence summed up
the shortcomings of the other-crimes rule by recognizing that there is "no rule (that]
can prescribe all the factors involved. Rule 55 merely sets forth the broadest and most
obvious guidelines." Id. at 104.
55 Id. at 103.
56 Id.
57 State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 299, 558 A.2d 833, 838 (1989). Soon after the
codification of the other-crimes rule, the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed its adherence to the principles articulated under the common law. See State v. Mulero, 51
N.J. 224, 228, 238 A.2d 682, 684 (1968) (citations omitted).
58 158 N.J. Super. 1, 385 A.2d 304 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 473, 401 A.2d
229 (1978).
59 Id. at 4, 385 A.2d at 306.
60 In a Rule 8 hearing, the trial judge must ascertain what impact a defendant's
other crimes would have on the jurors' assessment of the defendant's character and
whether the occurrence of the other crimes satisfied the clear and convincing standard. See N.J. Evid. R. 8; Wis0n, 158 N.J. Super. at 8, 385 A.2d 308. Specifically, Rule
8(1) provided in pertinent part:
When the... admissibility of evidence ... is stated in these rules to be
subject to a condition, and the fulfillment of the condition is in issue,
that issue is to be determined by the judge. In his determination the
rules of evidence shall not apply except for Rule 4 or a valid claim of
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the prosecution sought to introduce evidence involving the defendant's previous instances of child abuse for the purpose of proving the defendant's intent and rebutting the defendant's assertion
that the death was caused by mistake or accident.6 1 The appellate
division affirmed the lower court's decision and required the prosecution to prove the other instances of child abuse by clear and
convincing evidence.6 2
Adopting the clear and convincing standard, the Wilson court
recognized, did not relieve the State's burden of proving the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.6" Accordingly, the exclusionary nature of the New Jersey other-crimes
rule was once again reaffirmed.' Thus, the Wilson decision significantly curbed the prejudicial impact of other-crimes evidence in
criminal cases by requiring clear and convincing proof of the other
crime. 65
privilege. The judge shall indicate to the parties which one has the burden of producing evidence and the burden of proof on such issue as
implied by the rule under which the question arises. The judge may
hear and determine such matters out of the presence or hearing of the
jury.
NJ. Evid. R. 8(1).
61 Wilso, 158 N.J. Super. at 4-5, 385 A.2d at 306.
62 Id. at 6, 385 A.2d at 307. The Wilson court stated that there was no NewJersey
precedent regarding the appropriate standard of proof in admitting evidence of the
defendant's other crimes. Id. Relying on a wide range of out-of-state authority that
dictated clear and convincing evidence as the appropriate standard, the majority
asserted:
[Evidence when] found to be independently relevant and admissible,
need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, either as to its commission or as to defendant's connection therewith, but for the jury to be
entitled to consider it there must of course be substantial evidence of
these facts, and some courts have used the formula that it must be "clear
and convincing." And it is believed that before the evidence is admitted
at all, this factor of the substantial or unconvincing quality of the proof
should be weighed in the balance.
Id. at 8, 385 A.2d at 308 (citation omitted).
63 Id. at 10, 385 A.2d at 309. The court expanded this reasoning by establishing
that:
Every fact or circumstance relied upon by the State need not be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. Each element, of which the facts and circumstances of a case are a part, must be so proved. Thus, it is sufficient
for conviction that the jury is satisfied upon the whole evidence that
each element of the crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id. at 9, 385 A.2d at 308 (quoting State v. May, 235 S.E.2d 178, 185 (N.C. 1977)).
64 See N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 1 (discussing the exclusionary nature of Rule 55); cf.
Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 685-92 (1988) (utilizing the inclusionary
approach by not requiring heightened proof of the occurrence of a defendant's other
crimes prior to its admittance). See infra note 137 (analyzing the Huddleston decision).
65 See N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 1; cf. Burbridge v. Paschal, 239 N.J. Super. 139, 155, 570
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The danger of admitting unreliable other-crimes evidence was
again revisited in State v. Humphrey." Humphrey was indicted for
receiving stolen property.67 In that indictment, the State sought to
introduce evidence of a previous conviction on a charge of disorderly conduct for receiving stolen property to demonstrate that
Humphrey had knowingly received the stolen goods.68
The Humphrey court agreed with the Wilson court's adoption of
the clear and convincing evidence standard to prove the other
crimes, 69 asserting that convictions for disorderly persons offenses
constitute hearsay and are thus inadmissible to prove an element
of the charged offense.7 ° Despite its admissibility under Rule 55,
therefore, the Humphrey court excluded the evidence of the defendant's prior crime under Rule 63(20) based on its hearsay character. 7 ' Moreover, the Humphrey decision outlined an approach for
A.2d 1250, 1258-59 (1990) (ruling that in a civil case, other civil wrongs must be
proved by a preponderance of the evidence).
66 183 N.J. Super. 580, 444 A.2d 1135 (Law Div. 1982).
67 Id. at 582, 444 A.2d at 1136.
68 Id. at 586, 444 A. 2d at 1138. Pursuant to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:20-7(b) (2), the
court explained, the defendant's prior conviction would have raised a presumption of
guilt as to the commission of the crime. Id. at 582, 444 A.2d at 1136. The court,
however, rejected the statute's presumption of guilt by reasoning that upholding the
statute would contravene the presumption of innocence, an inherent component of
American jurisprudence. Id. at 583-84, 444 A.2d at 1136-37. Instead, the court interpreted the statute as giving rise to an inference of guilt. Id. at 584, 444 A.2d at 1137.
69 Id. at 586, 444 A.2d at 1137 (citing State v. Wilson, 158 N.J. Super. 1, 5-8, 385
A.2d 304, 307-08 (App. Div. 1978)).
70 Id. at 589, 444 A.2d at 1139. The Humphrey court recognized that "disorderly
persons violations 'have legislatively and judicially been dealt with not as crimes but as
lesser offenses which do not carry the stigma or disabilities incident' to criminal convictions." Id. at 590, 444 A.2d at 1140 (quoting Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281,
293, 277 A.2d 216, 222 (1971)).
In dealing with the admissibility of defendant's prior conviction, the Humphrey
court relied heavily on a prior New Jersey Supreme Court holding. Id. at 587, 444
A.2d at 1138 (citing State v. Ingenito, 87 N.J. 204, 432 A.2d 912 (1981)). In Ingenito,
the prosecution sought to introduce the testimony of a county clerk regarding the
defendant's prior conviction for a similar sale of illegal weapons. Ingenito, 87 N.J. at
207, 432 A.2d at 913-14. The Ingenito court excluded the clerk's testimony because
"[t] he effect of the prosecution's submission of the prior conviction in this case was to
create a near-mandatory presumption in the minds of the jurors as to the guilt of the
defendant." Id. at 220, 432 A.2d at 920. Justice Schreiber's concurrence focused on
the nature of the evidence, stating that the "admissibility of a prior conviction record
to prove facts established therein and essential in a subsequent criminal proceeding
would appear to be subject to the hearsay objection." Id. at 223-24, 432 A.2d at 922
(Schreiber, J., concurring).
71 Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. at 589, 444 A.2d at 1139. The Humphrey court noted
that the use a defendant's prior convictions record was limited to civil proceedings.
Id., 444 A.2d at 1140. If a prior conviction was used to prosecute a defendant in a
criminal case, the court reasoned that admission of such evidence would commensu-
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determining the propriety of admitting other-crimes evidence. 2
The application of Rule 55 also extends to other areas of admissibility. 7 In fact, the admissibility of other-crimes evidence implicates at least five other evidence rules.7 4 For instance, the
rately abridge the defendant's right to a trial by jury. Id. at 587, 444 A.2d at 1138-39
(quoting Ingenito, 87 N.J. at 213, 432 A.2d at 916).
Generally, the court asserted that the defendant's other crimes may be introduced only for limited purposes and not as sole proof of a substantive issue. Id. at
585, 444 A.2d at 1137. Moreover, relying on Justice Schreiber's concurrence in Ingenito, the court continued that the reliability of hearsay evidence was questionable
when offered to show an element of the charged offense. Id. at 590, 444 A.2d at 1140.
The Humphrey court ruled that hearsay evidence, as opposed to evidence proved by
clear and convincing evidence, was unreliable and unduly prejudicial to the defendant. Id. at 586, 589, 590-91, 444 A.2d at 1138, 1139, 1140; see also State v. Hummel, 132
N.J. Super. 412, 424-25, 334 A.2d 52, 58 (App. Div.) (excluding the hearsay testimony
of a rape victim regarding statements of another alleged victim not related to the
trial), certif denied, 67 N.J. 102, 335 A.2d 54 (1975).
72 See Humphrey, 183 NJ. Super. at 586, 444 A.2d at 1138. The Humphrey court set
up a three-step process to safeguard the defendant against the extreme prejudice that
the automatic admission of his other crimes would create. See id. First, the court explained, the other crime must be admitted to prove an issue advanced by the rest of
the evidence at trial. Id. Second, the court continued, the State must prove the other
crime by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Third, the Humphrey court asserted that
the jury must be effectively appraised of the permissible uses of the other-crimes evidence. Id.
73 See McGRoRy, supra note 2, at 204.
74 See N.J. Evid. R. 46, 47, 20, 48, 63(20). First, Rule 46 states that "[w]hen a person's character or a trait of his character is in issue, it may be proved.. . by evidence
of specific instances of the person's conduct, subject, however, to the limitation of
Rules 47 and 48." N.J. Evid. R. 46. Second, whenever the defendant brings in evidence of his good character to draw inferences as to his possible conduct, Rule 47
governs. N.J. Evid. R. 47. Specifically, Rule 47 provides in relevant part:
[s]pecific instances of conduct not the
Subject to Rules 48 and 55 ....
subject of a conviction of a crime shall be inadmissible. In a criminal
proceeding, evidence offered by the prosecution of a trait of character
of the defendant on trial may be admitted only if the judge has admitted evidence of good character offered by the defendant. Character
evidence offered by.the defendant may not be excluded under Rule 4.
Id.
Third, evidence of other crimes is admissible to impeach a witness as prescribed
in Rule 20, stating that "any party including the party calling [the witness] may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant upon the issue of credibility."
N.J. Evid. R. 20. Fourth, pursuant to Rule 48 specific acts of conduct are inadmissible
to show quality of conduct. N.J. Evid. R. 48 (asserting that "[e]vidence of a trait of a
person's character with respect to care or skill is inadmissible as tending to prove the
quality of his conduct on a specified occasion").
Lastly, other crimes regarded as hearsay are inadmissible in criminal disputes
under Rule 63(20), which states in pertinent part:
In a civil proceeding, except as otherwise provided by court order on
acceptance of a plea, evidence is admissible of a final judgment against
a party adjudging him guilty of an indictable offense in NewJersey or of
an offense which would constitute an indictable offense if committed in
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concurrent application of Rules 47, 48 and 55 illustrates an area of
confusion. 75 The drafters of the 1967 NewJersey Rules of Evidence
failed to simplify the interrelationship between these three rules by
not subjecting the application of one rule to another, save for Rule48, which is independently applied.76 Furthermore, Rule 55 is not
within the numerical proximity of other rules dealing with character evidence, thereby creating the impression that Rule 55 deals
with a distinct topic. 77 This has been the subject of great confusion
among New Jersey practitioners, who must engage in a "page flipping" campaign to comprehend the veiled harmony between these
rules.78
For instance, while Rule 47 does not allow a defendant's other
crimes to prove character unless the defendant has introduced evidence of his good nature, Rule 55 allows such evidence to prove
collateral issues. 79 The potential conflict between these two rules
was illustrated in State v. Slocum,"' where the defendant was convicted of robbery, assault and battery.81 At trial, in an attempt to
show the defendant's motive for committing the assault, the victim
testified that the defendant had robbed her store in 1968 and that
she had testified against him at trial.8 2
In assessing the admissibility of this evidence, the Slocum court
delineated the distinct parameters of both Rules 47 and 55.83 Writ-

ing for a unanimous court, Judge Lora explained that when challenging a witness's credibility, Rule 47 allowed only the admission
this state, as against that party to prove any fact essential to sustain the
judgment.
NJ. Evid. R. 63(20).
75 McGRoRy, supra note 2, at 204.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. It has been suggested, however, that if Rule 55 is read as an "exclusionary
character trait rule, the interrelationship of the three rules should become far less
difficult to grasp." Id.
79 N.J. Evid. R. 47 cmL 1; N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 3.
80 130 N.J. Super. 358, 327 A.2d 244 (App. Div. 1974).
81 Id. at 361, 327 A.2d at 245.
82 Id. at 361-62, 327 A.2d at 245-46. In 1973, the defendant entered the store
where the victim was employed. Id. at 361, 327 A.3d at 245-46. As the victim was
assisting the defendant to make a purchase, the defendant began beating the victim
with a club. Id. Thereafter, the defendant took money from the store and fled. Id.,
327 A.2d at 246. At the trial for the 1968 offense, however, the witness only testified
about what was missing from her store instead of relating the details of the assault. Id.
at 362, 327 A.2d at 246. The 1968 offense resulted in the defendant's conviction for
breaking into the store, but not for robbery. Id. On appeal, this conviction was subsequently reversed and the defendant was acquitted. Id.
83 Id, at 362-63, 327 A.2d at 246-47.
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of a defendant's prior convictions.8 4 In contrast, the judge noted,
Rule 55 allowed evidence of a defendant's other crimes to prove
collateral matters, even if the defendant had been acquitted of
those offenses.8 5 Therefore, according to the Slocum court, the
was the controlling factor in
purpose for introducing the evidence
86
apply.
to
rule
what
determining
Undoubtedly, evidence of a defendant's other crimes, which
has high probative value, also exerts the highest prejudicial impact
on the resolution of criminal disputes.8 Therefore, the probative
value of other-crimes evidence is the guiding axiom in determining
its admissibility."' The probative value of other-crimes evidence is
affected by factors such as the time lapse between the charged
crime and the other crime, the existence of alternative means of
proof, the necessity of the evidence, the similarities between the
charged crime and the other crime, and the prejudicial impact
that such evidence would have on the jury. 9
In State v. Ramseur," the New Jersey Supreme Court addressed
other crimes which were substantially separated in time from the
charged offense. 9 ' Ramseur was indicted for murder and sentenced to death.92 On his appeal to the New Jersey Supreme
Court, the defendant asserted, inter alia, that the trial court had
erroneously admitted evidence of his previous threats and physical
attacks on the victim. 9 3 After a Rule 8 hearing, the court permitted
Id. at 363, 327 A.2d at 246.
Id. Judge Lora explained that the trial court had informed the jury about the
nature of the other crimes and had described what transpired in the proceedings that
resulted in the defendant's acquittal. Id. at 362-63, 327 A.2d at 246. The use of other
crimes for which the defendant has been acquitted, however, seems problematic because "[i ] n a technical sense, an acquittal means only that thejury... decided that the
evidence was insufficient to convince it beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of
84
85

each essential element of the collateral offense." GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUcarION

§ 5.13, at 151 (2d ed. 1987).
Super. at 363, 327 A.2d at 246 (citations omitted); see also
State v. Schlanger, 197 N.J. Super 548, 551, 485 A.2d 354, 356 (Law Div. 1984) (concluding that Rule 55 is an exclusionary rule that focuses on the relevance of the evidence to prove collateral issues, while Rule 47 requires that there be a "conviction for
a crime tending to prove the character trait related to the case").
87 Schuster, supra note 3, at 947.
88 See State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 336, 605 A.2d 230, 234 (1992) (stating that
.even if the other-crime evidence is relevant to prove some legitimate trial issue, the
trial court must still exclude it unless, under Evidence Rule 4, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact").
89 McCoRMIcK, supra note 1, § 190, at 565.
90 106 N.J. 123, 524 A.2d 188 (1987).
91 Id. at 264-67, 524 A.2d at 259-60.
92 Id. at 163, 166, 524 A.2d at 207, 208.
93 Id. at 264, 524 A.2d at 259.
TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
86 See Slocum, 130 N.J.
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the witness to testify to circumstances in which the defendant, after
threatening the deceased, had resorted to violence against her, to
prove that the attack was knowing and purposeful. 9 4 The court asserted that the introduction of such evidence was justified in view
of the defendant's threats a few months prior to the murder. 95
The other incidents, the court explained, were introduced not only
to show the defendant's persistent resentment for the victim, but
also to negate the defendant's contention that the stabbing had
occurred as a result of a seizure. 9 6
Writing for the Ramseur majority, Chief Justice Wilentz noted
that temporal remoteness between the charged crime and the
other crime was immaterial. 97 The Chief Justice also observed that
trial courts possessed wide discretion in weighing both the prejudicial impact of the other-crimes evidence against its probative value
and the issuance of limiting instructions. 98 Noting that evidence of
arguments or violence between a defendant and a murder victim
has long been admitted in New Jersey cases, the court ruled that
94 Id. at 264-65, 524 A.2d at 259. In particular, the victim's grandchild testified
that approximately twelve to eighteen months prior to the murder, the parties engaged in an altercation. Id. On that occasion, the child stated, the defendant
threatened the victim. Id. at 264, 524 A.2d at 259. The day following this altercation,
the child explained, the defendant returned and after another altercation concerning
the visit of a male friend, physically assaulted the victim. Id. at 265, 524 A.2d at 259.
The grandchild also testified that three or four months before the murder, the defendant again visited the deceased while she was visited by the same male guest. Id.
At that point, the grandchild stated Ramseur told his victim he would kill her if he
caught her with that man again. Id. Later that day, the grandchild related, the defendant returned to Ms. Stokes's house and not only threatened her but also
threatened to kill her entire family. Id.
95 Id. at 267, 524 A.2d at 260.
96 Id. Introduction of this evidence, the court explained, was an attempt to prove
state of mind. Id.; see also State v. Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 373, 592 A.2d 572, 590
(App. Div. 1991) (admitting prior threats to show defendant's motive for murder).
97 See Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 267, 524 A.2d at 260. For a discussion of the Ramseur
standard, see McGRoRY, supra note 2, at 194. The Ramseur court noted that temporal
remoteness affects the probative value of evidence. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 266, 524 A.2d
at 259 (citing State v. Schuyler, 75 N.J.L. 487, 488, 68 A. 56, 57 (E. & A. 1907)) (stating that "the remoteness of the time of [the other crimes] goes solely to their weight,
and not to their admissibility").
ChiefJustice Wilentz accentuated the relevance of the prior incidents and established the nexus between them by asserting that:
The arguments that defendant had with Ms. Stokes one and one-half
years prior to the stabbing.., led to an act of violence that left Ms.
Stokes lying on the floor bleeding. Defendant's continuing hostility toward Ms. Stokes... [was] again demonstrated by the threats he made
three or four months prior to the stabbing.
Id. at 267, 524 A.2d at 260.
98 Id. at 266, 524 A.2d at 259.
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the evidence of prior threats and altercations was admissible.' In
light of the principles articulated in Noe4l'° the Ramseur decision
epitomizes the New Jersey court's emphasis on the relevance and
high probative value required of other-crimes evidence.' 0 '
In addition, the lack of alternative means of proof has generally led to the admission of other-crimes evidence, as illustrated in
State v. Stevens.10 2 In Stevens, the defendant, a police officer,
stopped and arrested a female suspect in connection with an alleged drug investigation.10 3 Stevens took the suspect back to the
police station and demanded that she undress so that he could
conduct a search.' 4 Thirty days later, the defendant brought another female to police headquarters, where he also compelled her
to undress allegedly to ease the process of searching her.'0 5 At trial
for these two instances, the lower court admitted evidence of three
similar instances of harassment towards females, which ranged
from conducting searches to engaging in sexual intercourse.' 0 6
Subsequently, Stevens was found guilty of official misconduct and
07

coercion. 1

99 Id. (citations omitted).
The Noel decision accentuated the need for a connection between the other
crime and the charged crime, and held that even a subsequent crime could be introduced to show an element of the charged offense. See State v. Noel, 102 NJ.L. 659,
672, 133 A. 274, 280 (E. & A. 1926); see also supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the Noel decision).
101 For other cases discussing the remoteness standard, see State v. Hasher, 246 N.J.
Super. 495, 498, 587 A.2d 1341, 1343 (Law Div. 1991) (establishing a two-part analysis
for determining the admissibility of remote other crimes); State v. Sands, 76 NJ. 127,
144, 386 A.2d 378, 387 (1978) (stating that "remoteness cannot ordinarily be determined by the passage of time alone" and therefore, "[t]he trial court must balance the
lapse of time and the nature of the crime").
102 115 N.J. 289, 558 A.2d 833 (1989). For a detailed analysis of the Stevens standard, see McGRoRY, supra note 2, at 188-92.
103 Stevens, 115 N.J. at 294, 558 A.2d at 835-36.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 294-95, 558 A.2d at 836.
106 Id. at 295-97, 558 A.2d at 836-37.
107 Id. at 293, 558 A.2d at 835. The appellate division affirmed his conviction. State
v. Stevens, 222 N.J. Super. 602, 622, 537 A.2d 774, 784 (App. Div.), certif denied, 111
N.J. 575, 546 A.2d 503 (1988), aftd, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A.2d 833 (1989). With only one
dissenting judge, the appellate division ratified the admittance of the other instances
of misconduct, ruling that such evidence demonstrated the defendant's state of mind
and that the defendant had acted pursuant to a plan. Id. at 617-18, 537 A.2d at 782.
The dissenting judge, however, believed that admitting the three other instances of
misconduct "shifted the focus of the trial from whether the defendant committed the
crimes charged to whether he committed those three wrongful acts." Id. at 622, 537
A.2d at 784 (Brody, J., dissenting). Moreover, Judge Brody did not see the connection between the other crimes and the charged offense so as to evince a continuous
state of mind. Id. at 623, 537 A.2d at 785 (Brody, J., dissenting). The trial court's
conflicting limiting instructions, Judge Brody criticized, failed to address properly the
100 Id.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Stein commenced the court's
analysis by tracing the historical development of the other-crimes
rule from its common law inception to its modern development. 10 8
The supreme court then unanimously affirmed the admission of
the three other instances of official misconduct."° Accordingly,
the court upheld the trial court's finding that "there was clear and
convincing evidence that the incidents had occurred and that their
probative value outweighed any prejudice to [the] defendant."" 0
In assessing the admissibility of the other crimes, the majority highlighted the rationale underlying the promulgation of the othercrimes rule."'
Furthermore, the Stevens court espoused, evidence of other
crimes is admissible if utilized to prove a genuine issue of fact." 2
Although the other instances of misconduct were highly prejudicial, in view of the lack of alternative evidence, the court concluded
that the other-crimes evidence was admissible to establish the defendant's objective for searching the victims."1
permissible purposes for which the evidence was offered. Id. at 624, 537 A.2d at 785
(Brody, J., dissenting). The dissent further criticized the majority for admitting the
other instances of misconduct because the defendant never challenged the legality of
the strip searches. Id. at 625, 537 A.2d at 786 (Brody, J., dissenting). Rather, the
dissent continued, the defendant denied the occurrence of the strip searches altogether. Id. Therefore, Judge Brody opined, the admission of the three other instances of misconduct violated the requirement that "[e ] vidence may not be admitted
under an exception in Rule 55 to rebut a defense that is not in issue." Id. (citations
omitted).
108 Id. at 298-304, 558 A.2d at 838-42.
109 Id. at 309, 558 A.2d at 844-45.
11o Id. at 297, 558 A.2d at 837.
111 Id. at 300, 558 A.2d at 839. Specifically, Justice Stein declared:
The motivating policies are said to be to avoid confusion, unfair surprise and prejudice. It is thought that proof of a previous crime will
distract the jury, leading them to forego an independent analysis of the
evidence and to rely merely on the tendency they possess in common
with most people of saying "once a thief-always a thief."
Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, the Stevens court stressed the importance of the
balancing process that trial courts must undertake "based on the specific context in
which the evidence is offered, to determine whether the probative worth of the evidence outweighs its potential for undue prejudice." Id. at 303, 558 A.2d at 841.
112 Id. at 301, 558 A.2d at 839.
"13 Id. at 308, 558 A.2d at 844. The majority examined the statute under which the
defendant was being charged. Id. at 304-05, 558 A.2d at 842. The applicable statute
stated in pertinent part:
A public servant is guilty of official misconduct when, with purpose to
obtain a benefit for himself or another or to injure or to deprive another
of a benefit: a. He commits an act relating to his office but constituting
an unauthorizedexercise of his official functions, knowing that such act is
unauthorized or he is committing such act in an unauthorized manner;
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Justice Stein found that the lower courts' limiting instructions,
although conflicting, clearly warned the jury of the forbidden inference about the defendant's tendency to harass women.'

14

Jus-

tice Stein, in his final remarks, however, regarded limiting
instructions as the most ineffective means of controlling the prejudicial impact of other-crimes evidence." 5 As a result, the justice
advised lower courts to issue carefully crafted limiting instructions
especially after introducing highly prejudicial evidence under Rule
55.116
Nonetheless, the Stevens court's emphasis on the requirement
that other crimes be excluded if there is alternative evidence is
problematic." 7 Moreover, the prejudicial impact of other-crimes
evidence is exacerbated when the defendant's other crimes are
Id. at 304, 558 A.2d at 842 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:30-2 (West 1970)) (emphasis
added). In assessing the defendant's knowledge as to the unauthorized nature of the
searches, the Stevens court reasoned that the "other-crime [sic] evidence was both probative and necessary to prove a fact genuinely in issue, with respect to which the
State's other evidence was limited." Id. at 308, 558 A.2d at 844; see also State v. Peltack,
172 N.J. Super. 287, 293, 411 A.2d 1156, 1159 (App. Div. 1980) (stating that the admissibility of a defendant's other crimes is definitely qualified by the requirement that it
be introduced in relation to a "fact in issue").
Moreover, Justice Stein reasoned that the other instances of misbehavior clearly
showed that the defendant had received a benefit, by indulging his sexual fantasies,
while conducting the illegal searches. Stevens, 115 NJ. at 306, 558 A.2d at 843. Additionally, the supreme court asserted that the circumstances surrounding the searches
were sufficient to show the defendant's purpose for searching his victims, and his
knowledge about the unauthorized nature of these searches. Id. at 307, 558 A.2d at
843.
114 Stevens, 115 N.J. at 309, 558 A.2d at 844. The Stevens court declared:
Although aspects of the instruction were somewhat contradictory, the
trial court twice cautioned the jury against considering the other-crime
evidence to prove defendant's disposition to commit the offenses with
which he was charged. Indeed, this was the essential point to be made
in the limiting instructions.... We are fully satisfied that in this case
any error arising from a lack of clarity in the limiting instruction was
harmless and not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.
Id.
115 Id. Justice Stein recognized that "the inherently prejudicial nature of [the othercrimes] evidence casts doubt on ajury's ability to follow even the most precise limiting
instruction." Id. (citation omitted).
116 Id. Due to the jury's inability to follow proper limiting instructions, Justice Stein
insisted that under Rule of Evidence 6, trial courts must "carefully and comprehensively" instruct juries by stating in detail the function of the evidence, and "to the
extent necessary for the jury's understanding, the issues on which such evidence is not
to be considered." Id.
117 See Balancing,supra note 1, at 772. One commentator explicated that when the
judge believes that the evidence introduced at trial is sufficient to support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, he excludes the other crimes introduced to show an
element of the offense. Id. If the jury disagrees with the judge's assessment of the
evidence presented and exonerates the defendant, the commentator observed, the
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similar to the charged offense.' 1 8 This tendency is well-illustrated
by cases in which the defendant's other similar crimes have been
introduced as part of the State's rebuttal to the defense of entrapment. 1 9 For example, in State v. Gibbons' the defendant was indicted for possessing and distributing narcotics.' 2 1 As a defense,
22
Gibbons contended that the undercover officer entrapped him.1
At trial, the prosecution sought to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior convictions for receiving stolen property and larceny in an effort to demonstrate his propensity to commit drugrelated offenses. 2 3 The Gibbons court, however, reversed the appellate division's decision permitting the admission of other-crimes
evidence, reasoning 4that the two prior offenses were distinct from
1
the crime charged.
Justice Handler, delivering the opinion of the court, recognized the difficulty in determining when two crimes are sufficiently
similar. 25 Despite this difficulty, the Gibbons court established
three criteria for examining the similarities between the charged
offense and the defendant's other crimes. 1 26 First, the justice
exclusion of the other crimes will have had a definite impact on the resolution of the
case. Id.
118 See State v. Lumumba, 253 NJ. Super. 375, 385, 601 A.2d 1178, 1183 (App. Div.
1992) (stating that "the average jury will much more readily accept the belief that one
is guilty of the crime charged where it is demonstrated that he has committed a similar crime"); State v. Sempsey, 141 NJ. Super. 317, 322, 358 A.2d 212, 214-15 (App.
Div. 1976) (recognizing that the "average individual is prone to much more readily
believe that a person is guilty of the crime charged if it is proved to his satisfaction
that the defendant has committed a similar crime"); State v. Inman, 140 N.J. Super.
510, 516, 357 A.2d 6, 9-10 (App. Div. 1976) (stating that similar crimes are admissible
"on the theory that the [other] activity of defendant was so nearly identical in method
as to earmark the crime with which he was charged as defendant's handiwork").
119 See State v. Dolce, 41 N.J. 422, 433, 197 A.2d 185, 191 (1964) (positing that
evidence of a defendant's other crimes is admissible to show his propensity to engage
in criminal actions). The rationale for this exception is that "a defendant pleading
entrapment has conceded the commission of acts that might otherwise constitute
criminal conduct.... Hence other-crimes evidence ... is not used to establish that
the defendant committed the crime, but to prove, as an independent issue, that the
defendant was predisposed." State v. Gibbons, 105 N.J. 67, 76-77, 519 A.2d 350, 355
(1987) (citation omitted).
120 105 NJ. 67, 519 A.2d 350 (1987).
121 Id. at 70, 519 A.2d at 351.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 71-72, 519 A.2d at 351-52.
124 Id. at 81, 519 A.2d at 357. The court recognized that in cases where the defendant has been charged with distribution of narcotics, the best other-crimes evidence is
that which relates to the defendant's other offenses involving the distribution of controlled substances. Id. at 85, 519 A.2d at 359.
125 Id. at 77, 519 A.2d at 355.
126 Id. at 80, 519 A.2d at 356-57. A broad standard based on intent, the court stated,
could erroneously allow irrelevant similar other crimes to be admitted. Id., 519 A.2d
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stated, courts must ascertain the essential elements of each

crime. 127 Second, the majority continued, courts must closely examine the elements shared by the other crimes and the charged
offense in view of the surrounding circumstances. 128 Lastly, Justice
Handler asserted, in reviewing these similarities, courts must assess
the objective of the crimes, the methods employed in committing
the crimes, and the requisite state of mind for those crimes." The
guidelines set by the Gibbons court significantly restricted the admissibility of other-crimes evidence.1'
In a recent case, State v. Cofield,'3 ' the New Jersey Supreme
Court also admitted evidence of a subsequent drug sale based
upon the similarities between the other crime and the charged offense. 312 Writing for the majority, Justice O'Hern reasoned that the
at 357. On the other hand, the court continued, a narrow standard could preclude
relevant evidence based on a lack of similarity to the charged crime. Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 80-81, 519 A.2d at 357.
129 Id. at 81, 519 A.2d at 357. The Gibbons court rejected the lower court's test of
"fairness in the particular case" because it would allow dissimilar other-crimes evidence that had no bearing on a defendant's predisposition to commit drug offenses.
Id. Cf State v. Brunson, 132 N.J. 377, 391, 628 A.2d 1085, 1092 (1993) (ruling that
similar crimes offered to impeach a testifying defendant are admissible only when
"limited to the degree of the crime and the date of the offense but excluding any
evidence of the specific crime of which defendant was convicted."); see also Henry
Gottlieb, Justices Rerite Law On Prior Convictions, 134 N.J. LJ. 801, 801 (July 5, 1993)
(discussing the possible impact of the Brunson decision).
130 See, e.g., State v. Lumumba, 253 N.J. Super. 375, 388, 601 A.2d 1178, 1185 (App.
Div. 1992) (excluding evidence of other crimes, although the same gunman, pistol
and car were utilized in both the other crime and the charged crime, because the
crimes were unrelated).
131 127 N.J. 328, 605 A.2d 230 (1992).
132 Id. at 340, 605 A.2d at 236. Accordingly, the Cofield court appears to have applied the Gibbons standard by admitting the evidence "because the incidents were
identical in location, similar in kind, and connected closely enough in time to allow
the jury to make the 'obvious connection' with possession, not propensity." Id. (citations omitted).
James Cofield, the defendant-appellant, along with three other individuals, was
arrested for the sale and distribution of cocaine outside a Newark, New Jersey club in
August of 1985. Id. at 331, 605 A.2d at 231. Although the defendant did not possess
any drugs at the time of his arrest, he and his brother were carrying a substantial
amount of cash. Id. Twenty-one days after his release on bail, on September 4, 1992,
Cofield returned to the same club and reestablished his drug-related operations. Id.
at 331-32, 605 A.2d at 231. Upon his second arrest, the police recovered drugs. Id. at
332, 605 A.2d at 232. Cofield was indicted for the two offenses and convicted of the
September 4th incident. Id. Consequently, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to disseminate drugs. Id. Curiously enough, the defendant was acquitted on the
count of possession. Id. Prior to the trial for the August 14th offense, the prosecution
sought to introduce evidence of Cofield's September offense. Id. At the Rule 8 hearing, however, the prosecutor merely stated that the defendant's other crimes were
admissible to prove a plan or intent. Id. Although admitting the September crime,
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other-crimes evidence was admissible because the charged offense
and the other crime were similar in nature, location and time
frame.'
Thus, the justice determined, the other crime and the
charged offense were sufficiently connected to show the defendant's constructive possession of illegal drugs.
Despite this determination, Justice O'Hern also recognized that the nature of the
other-crimes evidence involved in drug transactions could mislead
the jury as to how to apply Rule 55 properly. 35 Moreover, because
the trial judge's limiting instruction made insufficient reference to
the limited function of the other-crimes evidence and to the facts
of the matter, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the convic13 6
tion and remanded the case for further proceedings.
the trial court failed to instruct the jury about the purpose for introducing the othercrimes evidence. Id. at 340-41, 605 A.2d at 236.
With one dissenting judge, the appellate division affirmed the defendant's conviction. Id. at 333, 605 A.2d at 232. The supreme court recounted that the appellate
court's lone dissenter based his disagreement with the majority on the three propositions, which later became the basis of the defendant's appeal. Id. First, the dissent
contended that the September 4th incident tended to show only the defendant's propensity to engage in illegal drug related transactions. Id. The dissent further declared that the trial judge had failed to apply Rule 4 because the evidence's
prejudicial impact clearly outweighed its probative value. Id. Finally, the dissent criticized the lower court's limiting instructions for failing to curb the prejudicial impact
of the other-crimes evidence, in contravention to Rule 6. Id.
133 Id. at 340, 605 A.2d at 236. Thejustice also noted that the evidence was admissible to prove a genuinely disputed issue-the defendant's possession of drugs. Id. at
339, 605 A.2d at 235. Furthermore, the court reasoned, when the prosecution establishes the necessity of introducing the other-crimes evidence as proof of a genuine
fact in issue and the court has balanced the prejudicial impact of the evidence against
its probative value, the final hurdle is the issuance of limiting instructions. Id. at 34041, 605 A.2d at 236.
134 Id. at 340, 605 A.2d at 236. The supreme court determined that in drug transactions, a "special relevance" between the crime charged and the other crime would
have to be found. See id. at 337-38, 605 A.2d at 234-35. "Special relevance," the court
posited, was premised on the similarities between the charged offense and the othercrimes evidence. Id. at 338, 605 A.2d at 235. "Special relevance," the Cofield court
added, also scrutinizes the proximity in time between the charged act and the othercrimes evidence to determine its admissibility. Id. The Cofield court heightened the
requirements for the introduction of the other-crimes evidence and mandated a more
focused jury charge. Id. at 341, 605 A.2d at 236 (citation omitted). The majority also
recognized that the application of Rule 55 was more easily explained in the context of
cases with peculiar elements, i.e., signature crimes. Id. at 336, 605 A.2d at 234.
135 Id. at 337, 605 A.2d at 234. For recent cases dealing with drug-related othercrimes, see State v. Battle, 256 N.J. Super. 268, 284, 606 A.2d 1119, 1127 (App. Div.
1992) (allowing a police officer's testimony that he thought he had seen marijuana in
the defendant's car as part of the total criminal event and not as evidence of a different crime); State v. Ortiz, 253 N.J. Super. 239, 244, 601 A.2d 735, 738 (App. Div.
1992) (admitting evidence of drug transactions occurring minutes before the charged
crime as part of s gestae of the crime and therefore outside the scope of Rule 55).
136 Cofild, 127 N.J. at 341-42, 605 A.2d at 236-37. The court declared that a more
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Additionally, Justice O'Hern pointed out the problems experienced by federal courts that utilize a more permissive approach
towards the admittance of other-crimes evidence.13 7 In a case inacceptable jury charge would have focused the jury's attention on the specific uses of
the other-crimes evidence. Id. at 341, 605 A.2d at 236. The court recognized that the
trial court's limiting instructions were 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result."
Id. at 342, 605 A.2d at 237. Because the defense counsel failed to challenge the trial
court's limiting instruction, the court also recognized that error would be reversible
only if "the jury [was allowed] such free rein that it was clearly capable of confusing
propensity with possession." Id. at 341-42, 605 A.2d at 237. Therefore, as a matter of
course, the court continued, judicial recognition of the potential for extreme prejudice of other-crimes evidence has led to a general rule that requires limiting instructions to make "sufficient reference to the factual context of the case to enable the jury
to comprehend and appreciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere."
Id. at 341, 605 A.2d at 236 (quoting State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 304, 558 A.2d 833,
842 (1989)).
137 Id. at 334-35, 605 A.2d at 233. Justice O'Hern opined that this permissive approach adversely affected trial management and increased the frequency of reversible
error in criminal cases decided in federal courts. Id.; accord EdwardJ. Imwinkelried,
The Plan Theoy ForAdmitting Evidence Of The Defendant's Uncharged Crimes: A Microcosm
Of The Flaws In The UnchargedMisconduct Doctrine, 50 Mo. L. REV. 1, 2 (1985) [hereinafter Imwinkelried, Plan Theory] (stating that the admission of a defendant's other
crimes is the most common ground for appeal in federal criminal cases in many
jurisdictions).
Initially, federal circuit courts disagreed as to the appropriate standard of proof
for other-crimes evidence under Rule 404(b). For a discussion on the different standards of proof, see 1 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404[04] (Cum. Supp. Mar. 1992). In a
1988 decision, the Supreme Court put the issue to rest by ruling that there must only
be sufficient evidence tending to prove the other crime. United States v. Huddleston,
485 U.S. 681, 685 (1988). Furthermore, the Huddleston court abrogated the need for
a preliminary finding where the prosecutor was required to prove the other crime by
a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 687. In so ruling, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for a unanimous court, explained:
Rule 404(b) . . . protects against the introduction of extrinsic act evidence when that evidence is offered solely to prove character. The text
contains no intimation, however, that any preliminary showing is necessary before such evidence may be introduced for a proper purpose. If
offered for such a proper purpose, the evidence is subject only to general strictures limiting admissibility such as Rules 402 and 403.
Id. at 687-88. Referring to the Advisory Committee's Notes and Congressional Reports, the Huddleston majority underscored that the court had the discretionary powers to admit or exclude other-crimes evidence. Id. at 688. Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that Congress was more troubled by the effects that restrictions on other-crimes
evidence had on the prosecutor's case than by its prejudicial impact on the defendant. Id. at 688-89. Under the federal system, the Supreme Court posited, the prejudicial impact of other crimes is lessened by a four pronged test. Id. at 691. First, the
Court declared, the other-crimes evidence must be introduced for a permissible purpose. Id. Second, the Huddeston Court observed, courts must engage in a relevancy
determination governed by Rule 402 in conjunction with Rule 104(b). Id. Third,
under Rule 403, the Supreme Court asserted, the evidence must be more probative
than prejudicial. Id. Finally, the Court explained, under Rule 105, the trial court
must limit the scope of permissible inferences that the jury may draw from othercrimes evidence by issuing limiting instructions. Id. at 691-92. Under this analysis,
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volving the complexities of Cofiel, the majority noted, there was
for restricting the admissibility of otheran even greater necessity
3
crimes evidence.'1

Recognizing that other-crimes evidence may be subject to
abuse and overuse, the majority articulated a four prong analytical
framework that represented an attempt to curb the abusive manipulation of other-crimes evidence.13 9 Specifically, the Cofield court
established that the other crime must be: (1) relevant to an issue
in dispute; (2) similar and close in time to the charged offense; (3)
proved by clear and convincing evidence; and (4) more probative
than prejudicial."4 In establishing this standard, Justice O'Hern
readily recognized the need for preserving and enforcing the
other-crimes rule because it advanced two compelling and competing interests: it preserved the balance between the criminal defendant's right to a fair trial and the state's interest in exploiting
the probative value of other-crimes evidence.'
the trial court accepts the "prosecutor's foundational evidence at face value" and requires only sufficient evidence to support a finding that the other crimes, as the conditional fact, occurred. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS 131 (2d
ed. 1989).
The jury makes the ultimate decision as to whether the other crime occurred,
one commentator explained, and thus may be exposed to highly prejudicial evidence
which "at the close of the government's case, it might be told to ignore." Abraham P.
Ordover, Balancing The Presumptions Of Guilt And Innocence: Rules 404(b), 608(b) And
609(a), 38 EMORY L.J. 135, 137 n.7 (1989). The Huddleston decision, Ordover observed, was based "on the discredited premise that ajury can actually disregard extrinsic evidence simply because it is instructed to do so." Id. at 139-40.
For a full discussion of Huddleston and the federal permissive approach, see Jane
C. Hofmeyer, Note, A Relaxed Standard Of ProofForRule 404(b) Evidence: United States
v. Huddleston, 6 CooLEY L. REv. 79, 89-91 (1989) (asserting that, in Huddleston, the
Supreme Court liberalized the application of Rule 404(b) by adopting the inclusionary approach and by stating that there are sufficient safeguards against the prejudicial
impact of other-crimes evidence); Ordover, supra, at 137-40 (stating that Huddleston
stripped criminal defendants of common law safeguards).
138 Cofi/eld 127 N.J. at 334, 605 A.2d at 233. The Cofield case, the court explained,
was complicated by a variety of factors. Id. Particularly, the court stated, the defendant, his brother and two other individuals were indicted for the August offense. Id. at
332, 605 A.2d at 232. These two individuals, the majority pointed out, however, were
not involved in the September incident, and although the defendant's brother was
involved in both transactions, he was not indicted for the latter offense. Id. The court
explained that Cofield was further complicated by the fact that the other-crimes evidence was admissible only against defendant Cofield. Id. at 335, 605 A.2d at 233.
Lastly, the Cofield court declared, one of the defendants wanted the identity of the
informant, which the State was unwilling to provide. Id. All of these factors, the court
concluded, turned the Rule 8 pretrial evidentiary hearing into a very complicated and
time consuming process. Id.
139 See N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 1.
140 Cofidd, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A.2d at 235.
141 Id. at 334, 605 A.2d at 233. In concurrence, Justice Stein strongly attacked the
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THE NEWLY ADOPTED NEWJERSEY RuLE 404(B)

The adoption of Rule 55 in 1967 codified New Jersey's common law rule that excluded evidence of a criminal defendant's
other crimes when proffered merely to establish a defendant's
criminal propensity. 4 2 Because the introduction of a defendant's
other crimes breeds confusion and unfair surprise at trial, the
other-crimes rule allows collateral evidence only to prove a defendant's motive, identity, preparation, intent or plan. 143 Even though
collateral evidence is admitted under Rule 55, New Jersey courts
have attempted to curb the prejudicial impact of other-crimes evidence by promulgating procedural protections for criminal defendants. 144 Among these procedural protections is the
requirement that, prior to its admittance, the occurrence of the
other crime must be proved by a heightened level of proof, the
clear and convincing standard, in a Rule 8 hearing. 145
In the early 1980s, the NewJersey Supreme Court appointed a
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, chaired by the Honorable
Theodore I. Botter,J.A.D., to survey the feasibility of amending the
effectiveness of limiting instructions issued after the introduction of other-crimes evidence. Id. at 342, 605 A.2d at 237 (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Stein declared that
"no limiting instruction, no matter how meticulously phrased, can offset the devastatingly prejudicial impact of the proffered Rule 55 testimony." Id.
Legal commentators have also regarded limiting instructions as attempting to
"unring a bell or remove cream from coffee and as a 'mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only [the jury's] powers, but anybody else's.' A colorful analogy accuses
such instructions of being as effective as telling a little boy to go to a corner and not
think of elephants." Instructions, supra note 7, at 149.
Justice Stein did not dispute that the other-crimes evidence was relevant to prove
the issue of the defendant's constructive possession of narcotics. Cofie/d, 127 N.J. at
342, 605 A.2d at 237 (Stein, J., concurring). The justice found, however, that jurors
would be unable to divorce the permissible from the impermissible uses of such evidence. Id. at 343, 605 A.2d at 237 (Stein, J., concurring). Justice Stein believed that
the jurors' minds were "not divided into sealed compartments." Id. The prejudicial
impact of the other-crimes evidence outweighed its probative value, the concurrence
opined, and the State should have been forced to prove its case without introducing
the other crimes. Id.
142 See State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 299, 558 A.2d 833, 838 (1989) (listing New
Jersey cases articulating the common law rule). NewJersey case law mirrors the common law rule in the United States. Id.
143 Id. at 300, 558 A.2d at 839; see supra note 52 (providing the text of Rule 55).
The examples in the rule are merely illustrative and therefore not exclusive. Stevens,
115 NJ. at 300, 558 A.2d at 839.
144 See State v. Wilson, 158 N.J. Super. 1, 5-6, 385 A.2d 304, 307 (App. Div.), certif
denied, 79 NJ. 473, 401 A.2d 229 (1978) (noting that, in a criminal case, determining
the existence of prior events is governed by a clear and convincing standard).
145 Id. Trial courts must cautiously balance the probative value of other-crimes evidence against its prejudicial impact while giving careful consideration to the curative
effect of limiting instructions. FED. R. EviD. 105 advisory committee's note.
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New Jersey evidence rules.1 46 After several years of intense study,
the Botter Committee recommended a sweeping change in the
NewJersey evidence scheme.' 47 The proposed rules constituted an
amalgamation of the federal and then-current NewJersey evidence
rules, following federal numeration and arrangement.148 One of
the main justifications for the Botter Committee's recommenda1 49
tions was the achievement of uniformity with federal practice.
Pursuant to this rationale, New Jersey practitioners would benefit
from federal decisions construing the federal rules of evidence.150
The adoption of these proposed rules, however, will not
achieve the desired effect.' 5 First, only four of the proposed New
Jersey rules entirely resemble their federal counterparts, thus
thwarting the Committee's goal of uniformity.' 52 Second, the mere
fact that the federal rules have a larger precedential pool does not
automatically translate into the acquisition of more uniform re146 Richard Pliskin, N.J. Bar Seeks To Keep Evidence Rules Intact 131 N.J. L.J. 777, 777
(July 6, 1992). The Evidence Committee was comprised ofjudges, attorneys in both
public and private practice and law professors. Report of the Supreme Court Committee on
the Rules of Evidence, 129 N.J. L.J. 1, 1 (Oct. 10, 1991) [hereinafter The Report].
147 Pliskin, supra note 146, at 777.
148 Id. The Botter Committee recommended the adoption of federal evidence
rules that were equal or better to New Jersey's evidence rules and the preservation of
New Jersey rules considered to be superior to their federal counterparts. Id.
149 Id. The Committee estimated that the proposed rules would not override prior
practice and concluded:
[T] he overall effect, however, is neither startling nor radical and will not
substantially alter prevailing practice, although there are some important changes which are noted in the comments. The similarities between the federal rules and the 1967 New Jersey rules are far greater
than their differences, and the perception of the Committee is that the
New Jersey rules have worked well for the most part.
The Report, supranote 146, at 1; see also Nicholas A. Giuditta, III., ProposedState Evidence
Rules Searchfor Truth, 130 N.J. L.J. 371, 371 (Feb. 10, 1992) (stating that the amalgamation of the federal and the New Jersey evidence rules achieves the "best of both
worlds").
150 The Report, supra note 146, at 1. The Botter Committee firmly believed that the
proposed rules would create a larger body of precedent that would be of value to
those New Jersey attorneys who practice in federal courts because:
New Jersey attorneys who appear in federal courts, and in the courts of
sister states which have adopted the federal rules, would be conversant
with a common body of law. In addition, judges and attorneys would
gain insight and understanding in using the rules of evidence by the
availability of a wider body of precedent.
Id. Adoption of the Botter Committee's recommendations, however, could result in
mass confusion among attorneys who practice in both federal and New Jersey courts.
Simon L. Rosenbach, Confsion tIFReign Under Evidence-Rules Change, 132 N.J. LJ.
103, 103 (Sept. 21, 1992).
151 See Rosenbach, supra note 150, at 103 (asserting that "adopting the report is an
invitation to confusion, and a step unworthy of our bench and bar").
152 See id.
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suits.' 53 Furthermore, in adopting a middle ground between federal and New Jersey practice, the Botter Committee failed to
consider and/or resolve the differences between these two sets of
54
rules, thereby undermining the value of federal precedent.1
Moreover, the evidence rules within the federal system are not
uniformly applied.' 5 5 For example, federal courts of appeal frequently have differing interpretations of specific evidence rules.' 5 6
Thus, because the Botter Committee's proposals were adopted,
New Jersey courts will not only have to deal with the discrepancies
within the federal system, but also have to resolve the discrepancies
between the federal rules and the NewJersey proposed rules.' 5 7 In
so doing, NewJersey courts will lack any guidance on how to reconcile two clearly dissimilar, and in some instances conflicting, bodies
of precedent. 158 Under those circumstances, the litigation process
will become more unpredictable, cumbersome and complicated.' 5 9
Unfortunately, problems in the other-crimes rule have also been
overlooked by the NewJersey State Bar Association and NewJersey
See Giuditta, supra note 149, at 371.
According to one commentator:
[E]ven when the similarly numbered [NewJersey] rules address the same
general principle of evidence, the rules frequently require different results. After all, the Committee is not proposing that we change our law
of evidence, it is proposing that we merely change our rules of evidence:
the new rules will remain qualified by decisional law.
Rosenbach, supra note 150, at 103. Only a small number of New Jersey practitioners
have debated the attractiveness of adopting the proposed rules. See, e.g., id. at 103;
Giuditta, supra note 149, at 371; Pliskin, supra note 146, at 777. Compare Giuditta,
supra note 149, at 371 (commending the alleged compromise between the federal
and New Jersey evidence rules because in "keep [ing] some New Jersey rules rather
than substitut[ing] their less impressive federal" analogs the proposed rules elevate
common sense over "the plea for uniformity at all costs") withJames Hely, Why N.J.
Should Adapt FederalRules of Evidence, 130 N.J. L.J. 111, 111 (Jan. 13, 1992) (arguing
that New Jersey's failure to adopt all the federal rules, deprives the state's practitioners of "the advantage of all those judicial decisions that help define and give consistency to the trial of a case").
155 See Giuditta, supra note 149, at 371.
156 See id. For instance, circuit courts have different approaches as to the appropriate standard of proof in establishing the occurrence of the other crimes. See supra
note 137 for a discussion of the inconsistency of the permissive approach adopted by
the federal courts.
157 For a discussion of general discrepancies between the federal and New Jersey
evidence law, see Rosenbach, supra note 150, at 112.
158 But see Richard Pliskin, Federal Evidence Rules are Model For N.J. Plan--Supreme
Court Committee Calls for Similar Enumerating System, 129 N.J. L.J. 491, 491 (Oct. 17,
1991) (stating that the proposed rules would simplify the practice of attorneys who
litigate in both New Jersey and federal courts).
159 See Hely, supra note 154, at 111 (criticizing the proposed rules' deviations from
the federal rules because it is "[un]necessary to have two different rules of evidence
for the courts in which we practice this honored profession").
153
154
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Pursuant to the 1960 Evidence Act,
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the proposed rules

ON THE

PROPOSED RULES OF

EVmENCE (June 1991) [hereinafter BAR REPORT]. In fact, not much attention has been
given to the whole set of proposed rules. Rosenbach, supra note 150, at 103. Amazingly, when the proposed rules were released to the public, there was only one critical
commentary in a local newspaper. Id. Even the New Jersey State Bar Association
failed to respond promptly to the announcement of the proposed rules. Pliskin, supra
note 146, at 777. The NewJersey Bar Association appointed a Committee composed
of administrative law attorneys and trial attorneys to submit a recommendation as to
whether the proposed evidence rules should be adopted. Id. Perhaps due to the lack
of exposure to evidence practice of some members of the Committee, the Committee
failed to reach a consensus regarding the proposed rules. Id. The Bar As5--ciation
rejected the Committee's report, which merely outlined the different viewpoints espoused by the members. Id. The Bar Association requested an extension of the New
Jersey Supreme Court deadline for comments on the proposed rules. Id.
A second Committee was later appointed because the Bar Association believed
that "the Bar needed to present the Court with a single, coherent position on whether
the evidence rules should be modified according to the Botter Committee's recommendations." Id. After only two meetings held on June 1, and June 16, the second
Committee rejected the Botter Committee's recommendations. Id. In late June of
1992, the Bar Trustees endorsed the McGuire report in its entirety and delivered it to
the New.Jersey Supreme Court. Id. The McGuire report forcefully attacked the proposed rules, contending that "[t] here is no persuasive reason why years of practice,
experience and precedent should be discarded in favor of the adoption of the federal
rules." See BAR REPORT, sUpra, at 5. The primary thrust of the Bar Association's criticism was the renumbering of the NewJersey evidence rules to match the federal rules.
Id. at 2-5. The renumbering of the New Jersey rules would lead to great confusion
among New Jersey practitioners for various reasons. Id. at 3. The McGuire report
summarized:
[D]espite the fact that the rules would be numbered to match the federal rules, thus suggesting uniformity, only a very few of the federal
rules would be adopted verbatim. Many of the proposed rules would be
restatements of current NewJersey rules, but with new numbers. Many
others would derive partly from NewJersey rules and partly from federal
rules. Over a dozen current federal rules would not be adopted in any
form.
Moreover, despite the fact that the federal rules numbering system
has been adopted, some of the proposed rules are assigned numbers
which differ from their federal counterparts.
Id. Furthermore, the Bar Association attacked the Botter Committee's recommendations for failing to consider the inconspicuous, but serious disparities between the
New Jersey and the federal evidence practice. Id. The Bar Association recognized,
however, that numerous federal rules are substantively superior to the current New
Jersey evidence rules and recommended that a number of the proposed rules be
adopted. See id. at 5-28; see also Pliskin, supra note 146, at 777 (briefly summarizing the

proposed rules endorsed by the Bar Association).
161 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-33 to -49 (West 1960). See also N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 2
(1947) (stating that "[t] he Supreme Court is empowered to make rules governing the
administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in such courts"). Under the Evidence Act of 1960, the New Jersey Supreme
Court is vested with the authority to "adopt rules dealing with the admission or rejection of evidence." § 2A:84A-33. The NewJersey Supreme Court appointed a Commit-
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came into effect on July 1, 1993.162 The introduction of a party's
other crimes, wrongs and acts in civil and criminal cases will thus
be governed by NewJersey Rule 404(b) .16- The newly adopted rule
declares:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are
relevant to a material issue in dispute." M
At first glance, New Jersey Rule 404(b) seems to simplify the application of the other-crimes rule by eliminating the concurrent application of Rules 46, 48, and 55, and incorporating all four rules.16 5 In
tee on Evidence to review the feasibility of amending the evidence rules, conduct a
meticulous analysis of the evidence rules and submit a final recommendation to the
supreme court at a judicial conference. § 2A:84A-34. After the Committee on Evidence has submitted its recommendations to the justices, the court must make a public announcement by September 15, regarding the newly proposed rules. § 2A:84A35. The proposed amendments then come into effect the followingJuly 1, "provided,
however, that all such rules shall remain subject to cancellation at any time up to such
effective date by joint resolution to that effect adopted by the Senate and General
Assembly and signed by the Governor." § 2A:84A-36. The NewJersey Supreme Court
fixed a deadline, February 3, 1992, for comments on the proposed rules. Rosenbach,
supra note 150, at 103 n.1. This deadline was later extended until May 2, 1992, but
only two letters opposing the proposed amendments were received. Id. at 103. The
deadline for comments was extended a third time to accommodate the New Jersey
Bar Association which finally rendered its consensus report on June 26th, 1992. Pliskin, supra note 146, at 777.
162 See Stephen W. Townsend, Esq., Notices to the Bar: Supreme Court of New Jersey Revisions to the Rules of Evidence, 134 N.J. L.J. 798, 798 (July 5, 1993).
163 N.J.R.E. 404(b) (1993).
164 N.J.R.E. 404(b). See supra note 52 for the text of Rule 55, the old rule.
165 N.J.R.E. 404. New Jersey Rule 404 states:
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a
trait of his character, including a trait of care or skill or lack thereof, is
not admissible for the purpose of proving that the person acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the accused's character offered by the accused, which shall not be excluded
under Rule 403, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Characterof victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of the character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness
of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut
evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Characterof witness. Evidence of the character of a witness a
provided in Rule 608.
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to
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so doing, New Jersey Rule 404 does away with the cross-referencing
among the rules, thereby alleviating one source of confusion for New

Jersey practitioners."
The new other-crimes rule, however, creates problems in other
areas.' 6 7 One such problem is found in the first sentence of the newly
adopted rule.' 6 In that sentence, the Botter Committee adopted the
language verbatim from the original Federal Rule 404(b), 69 but substituted the word "disposition" for "character".17 The choice of the
word "disposition" over "character" could be viewed as one of semantics with little, if any, significance.' 71 In practice, however, the definition and scope of each term is distinct because the term "disposition"
is much narrower than the term "character." 172 Therefore, NewJersey
of Rule 55 and is not
Rule 404(b) retains the narrower construction
73
uniform with its federal counterpart'
show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.
(c) Characterand Charactertrait in issue. Evidence of a person's character or trait of character is admissible when that character or trait is an
element of a claim or defense.
Id.
While section (a) replaced Rule 48, section (b) displaced Rule 55, section (c)
replaced Rule 46 and section (a)(1), included a part of Rule 47. N.J.RIE. 404 cmt.
166 See McGRoRY, supra note 2, at 204 (discussing the confusion created by the crossreferencing among Rules 46, 47, 48 and 55).
167 See infra notes 257-65 and accompanying text for an example of one of these
potential problems, the danger of undue surprise to criminal defendants.
168 Wake Up, TrialLawyers, 134 N.J. L.J. 1068, 1068 (July 26, 1993) [hereinafter Wake

Up].

The 1975 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provided:
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (1975).
170 The word "disposition" was retained from the NewJersey Rule 55. N.J. Evid. R.
55. An additional, but insignificant change from the 1975 federal other-crimes rule is
that New Jersey Rule 404(b) specifically refers to the defendant's actions, "to show
that he acted," while the federal rule requires that the other crimes show "action."
Compare supra text accompanying note 164 (providing the text of New Jersey Rule
404(b)) with supra note 169 (offering the 1975 version of Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b)).
171 Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
169

172

"Disposition" only relates to "mental state,

...

an attitude, [a] prevailing ten-

dency, or inclination." BLACK's LAw DICIONARY 471 (6th ed. 1990). "Character" encompasses both "a connotation of some moral quality and an implication about the
manner in which an individual is likely to behave." Kuhns, supra note 1, at 794.
173 Compare N.J.R.E. 404(b) with FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
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The second sentence of the newly adopted rule has added "opportunity" and "preparation" to the list of purposes, codified in Rule
55, warranting the admission of other-crimes evidence.' 7 4 The addition of these two grounds for admitting evidence is apparently an attempt to make New Jersey Rule 404(b) mirror the federal othercrimes rule." 5 The addition of these two categories, however, is of
little importance because the list of codified purposes under Rule 55
is not all encompassing." 6 Therefore, other-crimes evidence showing
elements other than those identified in the rule may still be admissible so long as their introduction does not predominantly show the
defendant's disposition to commit a crime. 7 7 This will continue to be
the practice because, under the newly adopted other-crimes rule, trial
courts will enjoy wider discretion in ruling on the admissibility of
other crimes.' 7 8 The final phrase of New Jersey Rule 404, however,
restricts the types of relevant evidence that could be admissible for
demonstrating collateral matters. 179
Another problem in the adoption of New Jersey Rule 404(b) is
encountered when trying to reconcile the inclusionary approach,
found in federal Rule 404(b), with the exclusionary approach
adopted by New Jersey courts in their application of Rule 55.180 New
Jersey Rule 404(b) has preserved the exclusionary approach, which
regards evidence of other crimes as "admissible only to prove some
other fact in issue, and not a general disposition to commit crimes or
174 NJ.R.E. 404(b) cmt. See supra text accompanying note 164 for the text of New
Jersey Evidence Rule 404(b).
175 Compare N.J.RPE. 404(b) with FED. R. Evm. 404(b).
176 See 1963 REPORT, supra note 1, at 102-03.
177 Id. at 103.
178 See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (1975) senate judiciary committee report. The choice
of the phrase "may be admitted" in New Jersey Rule 404(b) rule evidently confers
broader discretionary powers in balancing the prejudicial impact against the probative value of other-crimes evidence. CompareNJ. Evid. R. 55 (stating that other-crimes
evidence is admissible so long as it does not "prove his disposition to commit crime")
with N.J.R.E. 404(b). The newly enacted other-crimes rule adopts the language of the
federal rule by utilizing the word "may" when referring to the admissibility of the
other-crimes evidence. NJ.R.E. 404(b). See supra text accompanying note 164 for
the text of New Jersey Rule 404(b). The choice of the word "may" highlights the wide
discretion of trial courts without "confer[ring] any arbitrary discretion on the trial
judge." See FED. R EvID. 404(b) (1975) senate judiciary committee report. This is not
to say that trial courts will enjoy unlimited discretion. Id. The trial judge must still
engage in a careful balancing process, considering factors such as "prejudice, confusion or waste of time." Id.
179 See N.J.R.E. 404 cmt. (explaining that the admissibility of other-crimes evidence
is determined by finding that such evidence is "relevant to a material issue in
dispute").
180 For a discussion on the differences between the inclusionary and the exclusionary approaches, see supra note 3.
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other wrongs."' 8 1 NewJersey Rule 404(b), however, does not provide
any guidance as to whether New Jersey courts should preserve the exclusionary approach 2or follow the federal approach by applying an
18
inclusionary policy.
Another flaw in the newly enacted other-crimes rule is the Botter
Committee's failure to codify important procedural safeguards, present in both Federal Rule 404(b) or New Jersey common law.18 3 The
absence of these safeguards undoubtedly jeopardizes the survival of
New Jersey's procedural protections against the use of other-crimes
evidence in a number of ways.184 First, under the newly adopted rules,
the assessment of what constitutes relevant evidence would be substantively different from the federal rules and the New Jersey current
rules.' 5 Second, while New Jersey common law mandates that evidence of other crimes be proved by clear and convincing evidence,
the federal rules do not require such a determination prior to admitting evidence."8 6 On this issue, the newly adopted rule is silent.' 8 7
Third, the issuance of limiting instructions under the new rules would
be not only confusing but incongruous with New Jersey's prior practice188 The ramifications of the Botter Committee's failure to consider these three areas is best illustrated by applying the proposed
1 89
rules to the four prong test articulated in State v. Cofie/d.
A.

Relevancy

The first prong of the Cofield test, requiring the determination
of what constitutes relevant evidence, will be substantively altered
under New Jersey Rules 401 and 402.9 Although former New
181 The Report, supra note 146, at 1.

182 See NJ.R.E. 404(b) & cmt.
183 Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See infra, notes 229-39 and accompanying text (discussing New Jersey and the
federal system's different standards of proof required for the admission of a defendant's other crimes).
187 See N.J.R.E.404(b) & cmt.
188 See infra notes 266-94 and accompanying text (discussing the issuance of limiting
instructions under the newly adopted rules).
189 See State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338, 605 A.2d 230, 235 (1992); see supra note
140 and accompanying text for the Cofield standard.
190 The determination of relevancy is based on the examination of two critical elements: the probative value of the evidence and the relation of the evidence to a
material issue. N.J. Evid. R. 1(2) cmt. 2. Generally, probative value is regarded as "the
necessity of the evidence." Balancing,supra note 1, at 771. Materiality, on the other
hand, relates to the "connection" between the evidence introduced and the issues in
the case. NJ. Evid. R. 1(2) cmt. 2.
Traditionally, evidence has been found relevant when:
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Jersey Rule 1 (2) limited relevant evidence to that which "proves a
natural fact," the New Jersey Supreme Court has construed that
rule as "focus[ed] upon whether the proffer renders the desired
inference more probable than it would be without the evidence."' 9 1 New Jersey Rule 401 now defines relevant evidence as
any fact of conse"having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove
" 19 2
action.
the
of
quence to the determination
NewJersey Rule 401, therefore, falls short of the broader standard of relevance articulated in the federal rules, which requires
that relevant evidence "hav[e] any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."1 9 In harmony with the federal rule, the principle of
logical relevance requires only that there be "any" tendency, thus
not requiring that the evidence persuade the factfinder or that it
prove a fact of consequence. 19 4 By contrast, New Jersey Rule 401
Facts, whether in issue or not, are relevant to each other when one is, or
probably may be, or probably may have been-the cause of the other;
the effect of the other; an effect of the same cause; a cause of the same
effect; or when the one shows that the other must or cannot have occurred, or probably does or did exist, or not; or that any fact does or did
exist, or not, which in the common course of events would either have
caused or have been caused by the other ....
JAMES F. STEPHEN, Q.C., A DIGEST IN THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 14-15 (1879).
191 See State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619, 477 A.2d 308, 312 (1984) (citations omitted).
192 N.J.R.E. 401.
193 FED. R. EvID. 401.
194 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A COMPREHENSIVE
REFERENCE TEXr 12 (1989). Logical relevance deals exclusively with circumstantial
evidence, such as a defendant's other crimes. Id. at 16. The threshold for the admissibility of circumstantial evidence when compared to that of direct evidence is minimal.
Id. The admissibility of direct evidence is determined based on whether the fact
proved is of consequence, and the determination of what constitutes a fact of consequence is based on the substantive law. Id. The following example illustrates the
difference between direct and circumstantial evidence:
If direct eyewitness testimony, for instance, is offered that the defendant
in [a] previous robbery... was the robber, the evidence is clearly relevant, since it relates to a proposition provable in the case. No inferences are required between the proof itself and the ultimate fact to be
established. If, however, the testimony proves the robber wore a blue
coat and the defendant owns a blue coat, this is circumstantial evidence
and theJudge must decide whether, if believed, it makes a disputed fact
more or less probable.
STEPHEN A. SALTZBuRG & KENNETH R. REDDEN, FEDERAL RuLES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL
86 (Michie 1982).
Undoubtedly, direct evidence possesses the greatest probative worth. CARLSON,
ET AL., MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE 239 (Michie 1983). Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 requires that the evidence manifest any tendency "considered in light of
logic, experience, and accepted assumptions concerning human behavior." GRAHAM,
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retained the phrase "a tendency in reason" from former NewJersey
Rule 1(2).111 Although the use of this phrase would preserve the
principle of logical relevance, it would be inconsistent with the
federal relevance rule." 6 Indeed, the federal advisory committee
disposed of the phrase "tendency in reason" because it unduly
stressed the logical process while ignoring the importance of
relying on life97 experience or science to make relevance
1

determinations.

By requiring that the evidence make a fact "more... probable
than it would be without the evidence," Federal Rule 401
prescribes that "any tendency" satisfy a probability standard. 98
The advisory committee to Federal Rule 401 has noted that the use
of probability in the rule's language effectively separates questions
of admissibility from those of sufficiency. 99 Thus, Federal Rule
401 does not require that the offered evidence establish a specific
fact by a level of persuasiveness. 2° The advisory committee recognized that a stringent standard would be both unworkable and
20 1
unrealistic.
New Jersey Rule 401, however, does not incorporate the
"probability" language in Federal Rule 401.202 Instead, New Jersey
Rule 401 requires that the evidence "prove or disprove," thereby
heightening the standard for relevancy decisions. 20 3 This heightsupra, at 11. As a result, the mere fact that the offered evidence has a low probative
value does not render it irrelevant. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra at 86. Logical relevance only requires that "as a matter of logic and experience," the item tends to support a particular inference and courts "try to determine whether there is a rational
nexus or connection between the item of evidence and the inference the item it is
offered to prove." CARLSON, supra, at 134.
195 See FED. R. Evm. 401 cmt. For pertinent parts of the text of Rule 1(2), see supra
note 52.
196 See Wake Up,supra note 168, at 1068; FED. R. Evm. 401 advisory committee's note
(stating that "tendency in reason" overemphasizes this logical relevancy).
197 See FED. R. EvrD. 401 advisory committee's note.
198 Id.
199 Id. Thus, Rule 401 requires only a "minimal logical relevancy; the item of evi-

dence, need not, by itself, persuade the trier of fact or be sufficient to persuade the
trier of fact, that the fact to be inferred is more probably true than not true." GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 13.
200 PAUL R RicE, EvmENC E: COMMON LAw AND FEDERA RuLEs OF EvmENcE § 2.03,
at 54 (1987).
201 FED. R. Evm. 401 advisory committee's note. Professor McCormick, in his famous remark "a brick is not a wall," clearly captured the essence of Federal Rule 401.
RicE, supra note 200, § 2.03, at 54 (citing McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 543). Traditionally, relevancy has been regarded as the brick, while sufficiency is the wall. GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 13.
202 Compare FED. R. Evto. 401 with N.J.RE. 401.
203 RicE, supra note 200, § 2.03, at 54. See N.J.R.E. 401 cmt. (stating that relevant
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ened standard will create difficulties in separating problems of admissibility from sufficiency, an area in which Federal Rule 401 has
been successful.2 °4 If NewJersey courts strictly follow the relevance
standard under NewJersey Rule 401, single items of circumstantial
evidence may be excluded.2 °5 In view of this higher threshold for
the admissibility of circumstantial evidence such as other crimes,
the assertion that New Jersey's newly adopted evidence rules seek
to achieve a degree of uniformity with their federal counterparts is
20 6
tenuous at best.

The Botter Committee incorporated the phrase "any fact of
consequence to the determination of the action" into New Jersey
Rule 401 to emulate its federal counterpart. 207 In so doing, the Botter Committee disregarded the use of the word "material," as
found in former NewJersey Rule 1 (2), because of its ambiguity and
potential for being "loosely used." 2 " The phrase "any fact of consequence," adopted in New Jersey Rule 401, defines the kind of
facts for which probative evidence may be offered. 2 9 Arguably, the
use of this phrase indicates that the fact sought to be established by
the evidence need not be disputed.21 0 The use of this phrase, however, seems to compel the conclusion that the evidence be offered
to prove matters in dispute.2 1 '
The second rule dealing with relevance generally compels the
inclusion of evidence that has been deemed relevant by providing
evidence is that "which has a tendency to make 'more probable or less probable' a
fact of consequence to the action").
204 See FED. R. Evm. 401 advisory committee's note.
205 The following example clearly demonstrates the danger in adopting the new
standard contained in New Jersey Rule 401:
[W] hen a violent death is shown, evidence that the defendant accused of
homicide was the beneficiary of a policy on the life of the deceased will
be admitted. So too with evidence that the accused had an opportunity
to commit the killing or that he expressed an intention to do so shortly
before the death. Motive, opportunity and design, taken together, may
make guilt more probable than not [without the evidence], but singly
each falls far short of establishing so high a probability.
McCoRmic, supra note 1, § 185, at 543 n.16 (citations omitted).
206 See Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
207 See N.J.R.E. 401.
208 N.J.R.E. 401 cmt.; see Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068. "At common law, the
terms 'material' and 'relevant' were used in conjunction with one another." GRAHAM,
supra note 194, at 15. These two terms are clearly distinguishable because material,
which later became a "fact of consequence," refers to an issue in the case and "relevance" describes "evidence which has a tendency to prove or disprove the proposition." Id.
209 See Wakeup, supra note 168, at 1068.
210 See id.
211 See SALrzuRG & REDDEN, supra note 194, at 87.
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that "all relevant evidence is admissible." 1 ' New Jersey Rule 402
retains former Rule 7(f)'s open door policy towards relevant evidence. 1 3 Consistent with prior New Jersey common law practice,
evidence which is indisputably relevant may be excluded under
New Jersey Rule 402 if its admission would contravene any other
rules of evidence, such as the other-crimes rule. 214 This is consistent with the former Rule 7(f), the keystone of the evidence rules,
which, at common law, had also been subjected to other statutes or
rules with policies calling for the exclusion of specific kinds of evidence. 2 15 Thus, NewJersey Rule 402 codifies the principle that evidence, while relevant, may be excluded based on the dictates of
other rules.

2 16

By codifying this principle, New Jersey Rule 402 mirrors Federal Rule 402, but this is where the similarities between the two
rules end.2 17 Federal Rule 402 has been praised for incorporating
the twin concepts that relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is excludable. 2 18 Unlike Federal Rule 402, however,
New Jersey Rule 402 does not specifically exclude irrelevant evidence. 2 19 By failing to codify such an exclusionary policy, New
Jersey Rule 402 has failed to incorporate the two "presupposition [s]
involved in the very conception of a rational system of evidence."2 2 °
The concept of relevance is most problematic when connected
with circumstantial evidence, such as other-crimes evidence, because relevant direct evidence invariably tends to establish a provable fact, while circumstantial evidence simply raises inferences.2 2 1
212 N.J.R.E. 402. New Jersey Rule 402 substantively mirrors the former Rule 7(f)
which also declares that "all relevant evidence is admissible." N.J. Evid. R. 7(f).
213 See N.J.R.E. 402 cmt.
214 N.J.RIE. 402 & cmt. (declaring that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in these
rules or by law, all relevant evidence is admissible").
215 N.J. Evid. R. 7(f) cmL 1. Although the language of Rule 7(f) does not explicitly
subject its application to other rules, New Jersey courts have not interpreted the rule
as being applied in a "vacuum." Id. For a discussion on the relationship between
former Rules 7(f) and 55, see State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47, 59-60, 424 A.2d 1182,
1188-89 (App. Div. 1980).
216 See N.J.RE. 402.
217 Compare FED. R. Evm. 402 with N.J.R.E. 402; see also N.J.R.E. 402 cmt.
218 See FED. R. EvID. 402 advisory committee's note.
219 See N.J.R.E. 402 cmt. Justifying the lack of a provision specifically excluding
irrelevant evidence, the drafters reasoned that the phrase "irrelevant evidence is inadmissible was omitted as self-evident." Id.
220 FED. R. Evm. 402 advisory committee's note. For the text of the federal rule, see
supra note 52.
221 N.J. Evid. R. 1(3). Relevant evidence can be either direct or circumstantial. Id.
The use of circumstantial evidence, such as a defendant's other crimes, is very problematic because "[t]he variety of relevancy problems is coextensive with the ingenuity
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The other-crimes rule is merely a restatement of the principles articulated in the relevance rules, but is directed towards dealing
with a special kind of evidence. 2
Deviating from the presumption of admissibility of relevant evidence in New Jersey Rule 402, however, New Jersey Rule 404(b)
clearly limits the relevance of a defendant's other crimes by incorporating the phrase "when such matters are relevant to a material
issue in dispute." 22 The addition of this phrase makes the relevancy decision under NewJersey Rule 404(b) more restrictive than
Rule 401's relevancy standard because of the requirement that a
dispute exist regarding the issues sought to be established. 224 Also,
the Committee commented that this addition was made to emphasize the provision of Rule 55 that ordinarily other-crimes evidence
is admissible only to prove some other fact in issue, not a criminal
defendant's general disposition to commit crimes or other wrongs,
thereby affirming New Jersey adherence to an exclusionary policy. 22 5 By specifically requiring that the other-crimes evidence be
relevant to a material issue in dispute, proposed Rule 404(b) differs from the federal and former New Jersey other-crimes rule,
both of which lack such a restriction.226
As part of the relevance analysis mandated in Cofie/d, trial
courts must examine the similarities and temporal remoteness between the charged crime and the defendant's other crimes. 2 7
of counsel in using circumstantial evidence as a means of proof." FED. R. EviD. 401
advisory committee's note.
222 Federal Rules 401 and 402 set forth the definition and parameters of what constitutes relevant evidence. See FED. R. Evm. 401 & 402. The other-crimes rule sets
forth what types of other crimes are relevant. See FED. R. EvD. 404(b); see also FED. R.
EVID. 401 advisory committee's note. The other-crimes rule also illustrates how the
admissibility of a specific kind of evidence is determined by balancing the probative
value of the evidence against its prejudicial impact. Id. (referring to Federal Rule of
Evidence 403).
223 N.J.LE. 404(b) cmt.
224 See id. The use of the term "material" is consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 401's phrase "fact of consequence." See Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068. This
is clear in that the phrase "fact of consequence" denotes that the issue sought to be
proved need not be disputed. See FED. R. Evm. 401 advisory committee's note. Thus,
Justice O'Hern's analytical framework in State v. Cofield and Justice Stein's in State v.
Stevens will survive the adoption of the newly adopted other-crimes rule. See supra
notes 102-17 and 131-41 (detailing the Stevens/Cofield standard).
225 N.J.R.E. 404(b) cmt.; see also N.J. Evid. R. 55 cmt. 1. (stating that the newly
adopted rule, New Jersey Rule 404(b) will preserve the exclusionary policy of the
former Rule 55).
226 N.J.R.E. 404(b) cmt. 1. See supra note 52 for the complete text of New Jersey
Rule 55 and Federal Rule 404(b).
227 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 340, 605 A.2d 230, 236 (1992). Seesupranotes 13141 and accompanying text (elaborating on the reasoning of the Cofield court).
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Therefore, under New Jersey Rule 404(b), other crimes that are
similar and close-in-time may be admissible only when "relevant to
228
a material issue in dispute."
B.

Standard of Proof

Moreover, New Jersey common law, as outlined in Cofield,
mandates that the occurrence of other crimes be proved by a clear
and convincing standard. 2 1 This requirement seeks to ensure that
irrelevant and unreliable other-crimes evidence is not admitted at
trial. 2- 0 Nonetheless, a preliminary finding as to the occurrence of
other crimes is not an absolute safeguard because the issue or element sought to be proved must be "genuinely disputed." 2 31 The
use of other-crimes evidence, however, justifies the imposition of
procedural safeguards that although not entirely effective, aid in
23 2
curbing the prejudicial impact of the defendant's other crimes.
Accordingly, the Botter Committee's failure to codify the
"clear and convincing" standard hinders NewJersey courts' efforts
in controlling the damaging impact of other-crimes evidence. 3
Indeed, the comments to New Jersey Rule 404(b) do not specify
whether the occurrence of the other crimes must be proved prior
to their admission at trial or whether they should be established by
clear and convincing evidence, thereby stripping criminal defendants of common law protections.2 3 4 This oversight will no doubt
exacerbate the confusion that New Jersey practitioners will experience when attempting to reconcile the federal other-crimes rule
with New Jersey Rule 404(b).235
The failure to codify the clear and convincing standard is even
more disturbing in light of United States v. Huddleston, where the
Supreme Court discarded the requirement that the trial judge
228 See NJ.R.E. 404(b).
229 Cofield, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A.2d at 235. Typically, trial courts conduct Rule 8
hearings, outside of the presence of the jury, to determine whether the contested

other-crimes evidence has met the requisite standard of proof. See supra note 60 for
the pertinent text of Rule 8.
230 See State v. Humphrey, 183 N.J. Super. 580, 585, 444 A.2d 1135, 1137 (Law Div.
1982); State v. Wilson, 158 NJ. Super. 1, 8, 385 A.2d 304, 308 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
79 NJ. 473, 401 A.2d 229 (1978).
231 See Cofie/d, 127 NJ. at 338-39, 605 A.2d at 235.
232 Wake Up, supranote 168, at 1068. See e.g., State v. Wilson, 158 NJ. 1, 6, 385 A.2d
304, 307 (App. Div. 1978) (requiring proof of other crimes by clear and convincing
evidence); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 301, 558 A.2d 833, 839 (1989) (mandating
that propensity evidence prove a genuinely disputed material issue).
233 Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.

234 See NJ.R.E. 404(b) cmt.
235 See Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
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make a preliminary finding as to the occurrence of the other
crimes.3 6 In addition, the United States Supreme Court did not
require that the other crime be proved by a particular level of persuasiveness.23 7 The Huddeston decision rejected the proposition

that a proponent must conclusively prove the occurrence of the
other crime because the Court found that such a condition was not
codified in Federal Rule 404(b) .238 Because these safeguards are
not codified in the new rule, a wide body of New Jersey precedent
may be overturned, thereby stripping criminal defendants of protections created by New Jersey common law.23 9
C. BalancingProcess
After finding a logical connection between the evidence offered and the facts of the case, the trial court must engage in a
balancing process, also outlined in Cofield 2 1

This concept has

been incorporated in the balancing test of Rule 403.241 The rules
assessing the relevance of the evidence and the balancing rule are
applied jointly in determining the admissibility of the evidence. 4 2
Generally, balancing the probative value of other-crimes evidence
against its prejudicial impact is based on policy considerations "justifying exclusion in instances where the probative benefit of the
evidence significantly fails to outweigh the practical burdens of its
admission."243 According to this analysis, even logically relevant ev236 United States v. Huddleson, 485 U.S. 681, 689 (1988). See supra note 137 (discussing the four-prong test formulated by the Court in Huddeston).
237 Huddkson, 485 U.S. at 687-88.
258 Id. at 687. Nevertheless, under the federal rules, the opponent of the evidence
still has a chance to attack its sufficiency before trial by making a motion in limine See
FED. R. Evm. 104(b).
239 For example, the new Rule 404(b) does not provide the defendant with the
right to request pretrial notice, thereby exacerbating the undue surprise. See NJ.R.E.
404(b); see also Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
240 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 340, 605 A.2d 230, 236 (1992).
241 N.J.R.E. 403.
242 See GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 14. Particularly, the interrelationship among
Rules 401, 402, and 403 has been described as follows:
The importance of Rule 403's correlative role with Rule 401 cannot be
over-emphasized. So long as there is at least some minimal probative
value, the minuteness of the probative value of a proffered item of evidence is not, under the Federal Rules, a reason to find the evidence
irrelevant, and to exclude it under Rule 401 in conjunction with Rule
402. But such minuteness increases the relative significance of any of
the "danger[s]" and "considerations" enumerated in Rule 403 which
may be presented by the evidence, so that these factors may be invoked
more readily as grounds for exclusion.
Id. (citation omitted).
243 GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW oF EVIDENcE 34-35 (2d ed.
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idence may be excluded and thus regarded as "legally
irrelevant."244
In New Jersey, the process of balancing the prejudicial impact
of other-crimes evidence against its probative value could be substantively changed by New Jersey Rule 403, which declares that:
Except as otherwise provided by these rules or other law, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of (a) undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, or misleading the jury or (b) undue delay, 2waste
of
45
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
New Jersey Rule 403 is more akin to the federal rules than its New
Jersey predecessor.246 The first sentence of NewJersey Rule 403 limits
1987). Under Federal Rule 403, the burden of proving that trial concerns outweigh
the probative value of the evidence rests with the party objecting to relevant evidence.
GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 20.
244 CARLSON, supra note 194,

at 237. The policy considerations that warrant the
exclusion of logically relevant evidence mostly involve trial administration concerns.
Id. Consequently, admissible circumstantial evidence must be both logically relevant
and legally relevant. Id. at 238. Ascertaining the legal relevance of other-crimes evidence is accomplished through a three-step process. Id. First, the trial judge must
evaluate the probative worth of the evidence. Id. As previously stated, logical relevance concerns circumstantial evidence and is therefore examined only when assessing the admissibility of other-crimes evidence. Id. at 239. Factors that the trial court
must examine in its assessment of the probative value of the evidence are:
[T] he importance of the fact of consequence for which the evidence is
offered in the context of the litigation, the strength and length of the
chain of inferences necessary to establish the fact of consequence, the
availability of alternative means of proof, whether the applicable fact of
consequence is being disputed, and, where appropriate, the potential
effectiveness of a limiting instruction ....
GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 20. Direct evidence is hardly ever excluded under this
balancing process since "it is unlikely that the trial concerns will 'substantially outweigh' that value." CARLSON, supra note 194, at 239. Second, trial courts must identify
the countervailing factors that must be weighed against the probative value of the
evidence. Id. Among the factors that trial courts must evaluate are undue or unfair
prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury and waste of time. Id. at 239-41.
Third, courts must strike a balance between the probative worth of the evidence and
the countervailing factors. Id. at 242. Accordingly, the trial judge "must do a 'costbenefit' analysis with respect to each item of evidence objected to under Rule 403. If
the 'costs' (listed in Rule 403) do not 'substantially' outweigh the 'benefits' (the probative value), the trial judge must admit the evidence." Id.
245 N.J.R.E. 403.
246 N.J.R.E. 403 cmt. NewJersey Rule 403's similarities with its federal counterpart
could be problematic because "[t ] he inclusionary approach of Rule 403 invites prosecutors to use every device possible to offer uncharged crime evidence against the
defendant, and illogically places the burden on the defendant to persuade the court
that the prosecution should not be permitted to win the admission of such evidence."
Ordover, supra note 137, at 187. This danger is further exacerbated by the failure of
the Botter Committee to codify the requirement that, in New Jersey, prior to its admissibility, a defendant's other crimes must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
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the discretion of the trial judge, which was left unrestricted under former Rule 4.247 Unfortunately, the problems normally encountered by
judges when analyzing the admissibility of other-crimes evidence will
still prevail under the newly enacted balancing approach. 248 The potential for problems is underscored by the fact that the trial judge is
not provided with any guidance as to the meaning of "substantially
outweighed" under New Jersey Rule 403.249
New Jersey Rule 403, similar to its federal counterpart, also embodies the principle of judicial economy. 2 0 Accordingly, New Jersey
Rule 403 has incorporated the phrases "undue delay," "waste of time"
and "needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 25 1 Former Rule
247 N.J.R.E. 403 cmt. As a general matter, trial judges enjoy wide discretion in balancing the probative value of the evidence against the countervailing factors. GRAHAM, supra note 194, at 28 & n.19. Rarely is a trial court reversed based on an
improper application of the balancing process. Id. at 28. Limiting the judge's discretion may contribute to consistency of results. Kuhns, supra note 1, at 804. Under
former Rule 4, as construed at common law, the judge's discretion was very broad. See
N.J. Evid. R. 4 cmt. 2. The trial judge, however, was still compelled to engage in a
balancing process considering "[t] he countervailing factors listed in the rule as possible grounds for excluding evidence [that] appear to be the only considerations that
can overcome the admission of probative evidence which is not otherwise excludable
under some other rule." N.J. Evid. R. 4 cmt. 1.
248 See GLEN WEISSENBERGER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 403.2, at 70-72 (Student ed.
1987).
249 See id. A legal commentator has reflected:
The word "substantial" is undoubtedly a word of some elasticity, and
ultimately in applying that standard, the trial judge has broad discretion. Consequendy, it is generally held that a trial judge's determination based on Rule 403 will be overturned only upon a showing of abuse
of his discretion. No precise definition of the term 'substantial' appears
in the Rules, yet it is clear that, at least symbolically, Rule 403 favors a
presumption of admissibility by mandating that the negative attribute of
the evidence must substantially outweigh its probative value before exclusion is justified.
Id. at 70-71. In the balancing process, trial courts must consider "the strength of the
evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between the crimes,
the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the evidence,
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably will
rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." McCoRMICK, supra note 1, § 190, at 565
(footnote omitted).
NewJersey Rule 403 lists "undue prejudice" as opposed to the federal rule's "unfair prejudice." Compare N.J.R.E. 403 with FED. R. Evm. 403; see also CARLSON, supra
note 194, at 240 (discussing how the use of "unfair prejudice" is illogical since all
evidence is in some sense prejudicial and unfair based on two reasons; first, emotions
play a role in the resolution of criminal disputes and, second, "appeals to faulty logic
may be just as unfair as appeals to improper passions").
250 See N.J.R.E. 403 cmt.; CARLSON, supra note 194, at 237.
251 See N.J.R.E. 403. In so doing, the new rule also incorporates Federal Rule 402,
which subjects the admissibility of relevant evidence to the principles of both judicial
economy and fairness to the defendant. See FED. R. EvID. 402 (providing that "[a] II
relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
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4 also incorporated the importance of judicial economy by requiring
the exclusion of evidence that would "necessitate undue consumption
of time."2 5 2 Under the newly adopted rule, the grounds for excluding
evidence based on judicial economy seem to have been expanded.2 5 3
The phrases "undue delay," "waste of time" and "needless presentation of cumulative evidence," however, overlap with one another and
with the other risks outlined in the new rule. 254 The addition of
"needless presentation of cumulative evidence" will undoubtedly expand the trial judge's discretion. 25 5 The balancing process, however,
will become burdensome because the trial judge will be forced to scruintroduced at trial to ensure that the
tinize thoroughly the evidence
256
overlap.
not
does
evidence
i.

Danger of Undue Surprise

Neither New Jersey Rule 403 nor its federal counterpart include the danger of undue surprise to criminal defendants as
grounds for excluding evidence. 2 7 Federal Rule 404(b), however,
cured that defect by imposing an obligation on the prosecutor to
furnish the defendant with notice, if requested, whenever he or she
intends to introduce other-crimes evidence because the defendant
could be unduly surprised by the introduction of his other
crimes. 258 The addition of this pretrial notice expedites the resoluthe United States, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.").
252 N.J. Evid. R. 4.
253 See N.J.R.E. 403.
254 CARLSON, supra note 194, at 241.

255 See i&L Particularly, the trial judge will have wider discretion in restricting the
number of witnesses that may testify regarding one matter, and also with regard to the
scope of cross-examination. Id. The introduction of rebuttal evidence would also be
subject to this limitation "particularly where the case in chief of each side has been
time consuming, and the rebuttal proof appears largely to be a reiteration of the case
in chief." Id.
256 See id. at 241.
257 FED. R. Evm. 403 advisory committee's note 403.3 (1993). Under Uniform
Rule 45, danger of surprise is listed as a ground for excluding otherwise relevant
evidence. Id. That both the federal and the New Jersey rules neglected to add a
provision to guard against undue surprise is surprising because both sets of rules were
modeled after the Uniform Evidence Rules. See id. In that regard, the Advisory Committee to the federal rules found that "[w] hile it can scarcely be doubted that claims of
unfair surprise may still be justified despite procedural requirements of notice and
instrumentalities of discovery, the granting of a continuance is a more appropriate
remedy than exclusion of the evidence." Id. Moreover, the advisory committee was
concerned with the difficulties in estimating what would constitute "undue surprise"
as a ground for excluding evidence. Id.
258 FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee's note to 1991 Amendment of Subdivision (b) (1991). Early in the 1980s, a legal commentator strongly criticized the lack
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tion of admissibility questions, 259 and establishes a nexus between
the federal other-crimes rule and other disclosure rules.26 Thus, if
a federal court finds that the prosecutor has not complied with the
defense attorney's request 1for notice, the other-crimes evidence
26
will be held inadmissible.
Unlike the federal other-crimes rule, newly enacted New
26 2
Jersey Rule 404(b) does not contain a pretrial notice provision.
of a pretrial notice provision of a prosecutor's use of uncharged misconduct evidence
in the 1975 version of Federal Rule 404(b). EdwardJ. Imwinkelried, The Worst Surprise
Of Alk No Right To PretrialDiscovery Of The Prosecutor'sUnchargedMisconduct Evidence, 56
FoRDHAm L. REv. 247, 247-48 & nn. 1-2, 251 (1987) [hereinafter, Imwinkelried, Worst
Surprise]. In view of the lack of a pretrial notice provision in the federal other-crimes
nile, the use of a defendant's other crimes had been regarded as the prosecutor's
delight. Imwinkelried, Plan Theory, supra note 137, at 2.
In 1991, Federal Rule 404(b) was amended to include a pretrial notice requirement in criminal cases, thereby minimizing the danger of undue surprise to the defendant by compelling the prosecutor to notify the defendant of his intentions to
present other-crimes evidence. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) 1991 Amendment to Subdivision
(b) (1991). Under this procedure, the defense counsel secures an opportunity to file
a motion in limine as a means to exclude highly prejudicial evidence, such as the
defendant's other crimes. FED. R. EviD. 404(b) advisory committee's note. Motions
in limine are often used by the opponent to exclude the evidence before trial. Imwinkelried, Plan Theory, supra note 137, at 9. The proponent of the evidence, however, may file such a motion in order to secure a ruling on the admissibility of the
evidence. Id. If the motion in limine is not filed in a timely fashion, the jury may be
exposed to highly prejudicial evidence. Id. Thus, a defendant should attempt to exclude the evidence prior to the beginning of the trial. Id.
259 FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee's note to 1991 Amendment of Subdivision (b).
260 Id. One of the main criticisms of the original federal other-crimes rule in the
criminal discovery procedures has been the "defendant's inability to force pretrial
revelation of that evidence." Imwinkelried, Worst Surprise, supra note 258, at 251.
Under the amended federal rule, the prosecution is not overly burdened by this pretrial notice because the new rule only requires that "the prosecution appraise the
defense of the general nature of the evidence of extrinsic acts." Id. In his pretrial
notice, the prosecutor is not required to state with particularity the defendant's other
crimes. Id. The notice, however, must be reasonable under the circumstances. Id.
Interestingly, a former NewJersey hearsay evidence rule had implemented a similar notice provision. See N.J. Evid. R. 64 cmt. (noting that this "rule does not specify a
precise time requirement for serving notice, but states only that notice be given in
such a manner as to give the adverse party a 'fair opportunity' to meet the evidence.
Undoubtedly, what is a 'fair opportunity' will depend upon the facts of a given case.").
261 FED. R. Evm. 404(b) advisory committee's note to 1991 Amendment of Subdivision (b).
262 See NJ.R.E. 404(b). Seemingly, that a criminal defendant has no right to pretrial notice of the prosecutor's intention to use other-crimes evidence at trial is unfair
and against the premises of pretrial discovery. See Worst Surprise, supra note 258, at
251. For instance, under New Jersey Court Rule 3:12A, a defendant is obliged to
notify the prosecutor in writing of an intent to raise the entrapment defense. N.J. C.
k 3:12A. Conversely, if the prosecutor intends to use the defendant's other crimes to
rebut this defense, the State need not notify the defendant. See N.J.R.E. 404(b).
Arguably, the Committee's reason for not including a pretrial notice provision in
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The failure to include a pretrial notice provision, therefore, will
result in undue surprise to criminal defendants. 263 Consequently,
the defendant will be defenseless and unprepared to rebut the evidence. 264 Thus, similar to the original federal rule, the introduction of other-crimes evidence under newly enacted NewJersey Rule
404(b) will, more likely than not, impact negatively upon the resolution of criminal prosecutions.2 6 5
the newly enacted other-crimes rule may rest on the 1973 liberalization of New Jersey
criminal discovery rules. See N.J. CT. R. 3:13-3 cmt. 1. The 1973 amendments effectively made "the prosecutor's entire file available to the defendant as a matter of the
defendant's right and upon the defendant's demand, subject, of course, to the State's
legitimate and disclosed need for an appropriate protective order." Id. In reviewing
the prosecution's files, the defendant may discover, or at least surmise, that the prosecutor may use other-crimes evidence. See Worst Surprise, supranote 258, at 251-52 n.41.
Nonetheless, criminal defendants still lack the right to demand pretrial notice of the
prosecutor's intentions to introduce their other crimes. See N.J.R.E. 404(b).
263 Worst Surprise, supra note 258, at 251.
264 Id.
265 See id. at 256-60 (criticizing the original FED. R. EVID. 404 (b)).
In addition to reducing the danger of undue surprise, a pretrial notice requirement could benefit the defense counsel in ascertaining the accuracy of the prosecutor's knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the other crimes. Id. at 258.
Pretrial knowledge of the prosecutor's intention to use other-crimes evidence unquestionably abates the likelihood of erroneous rulings on the admissibility of the evidence. Id. Under the newly enacted rule, the prosecutor will be able to introduce
other-crimes evidence based on a "vague theory of relevance" forcing the trial judge
to resolve the issue speedily and based solely on general objections. See id. at 256.
Pretrial notice of the prosecutor's plan to use the other-crimes evidence would clearly
advance the goals of a fair criminal trial. See id. at 274.
Notably, the disadvantages in requiring pretrial discovery of the prosecutor's intention to use a defendant's other crimes are substantially outweighed by its advantages. See id. For example, pretrial discovery of other-crimes evidence may encourage
the defense to concoct perjured statements. See Id. at 266-68 (asserting that "pretrial
revelation of uncharged misconduct evidence will facilitate the defense's ability to
fabricate perjured testimony to rebut the prosecution's evidence"). Forcing the prosecution to outline its theory for introducing the evidence prior to trial or the possible
harassment of the prosecution's witnesses may also be pitfalls to requiring the pretrial
notice. Id. at 266-73. These concerns, although valid, may be eradicated by requiring
the prosecutor to disclose only the plan to use the defendant's other crime, as codified in the 1991 Federal Rule 404(b). Id. at 268. The failure to -include a pretrial
notice provision, coupled with the absence of a requirement to prove the othercrimes evidence, clearly exacerbates the danger of undue surprise and of prejudice
towards the defendant. Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068. But see Huddleston v.
United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1988) (maintaining that Federal Rule 404(b)
does not require the government to make a preliminary showing of proof of an extrinsic act prior to its admission into evidence). In New Jersey, the absence of the
pretrial provision does not create a problem in itself; its absence, however, coupled
with the Botter Committee's failure to codify the requirement that the other crime be
proved by clear and convincing evidence will most likely overturn State v. Wilson, 158
N.J. Super. 1, 385 A.2d 304 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 79 N.J. 473 (1978). See Wake Up,
supra note 168, at 1068.
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Limiting Instructions

When engaging in the balancing process mandated by New
Jersey Rule 403, the trial court must also consider the effectiveness
of any possible limiting instructions.2 61 The trial court's function
of issuing limiting instructions will, no doubt, be substantially
changed by newly enacted New Jersey Rule 105,267 which states:
When evidence is admitted as to one party or for one purpose
but is not admissible as to another party or for another purpose,
the judge, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper
scope and shall instruct the jury accordingly,
but may permit a
268
party to waive a limiting instruction.
NewJersey Rule 105, taken almost verbatim from its federal counterpart,269 commands that parties request limiting instructions.2 7 °
Under New Jersey Rule 105 the trial judge's authority to issue instructions sua sponte would be confined to instances where "the error or
omission . . . is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of
producing an unjust result."27 1 In practice, attorneys may choose to
abstain from requesting limiting instructions for strategic reasons.272
266 See GRAiiAM, supra note 194, at 22. In deciding whether to request a limiting
instruction, trial attorneys are constrained to engage in a balancing process of their
own between the probative value of the evidence and its prejudicial impact. See HON.
JOSEPH H. RODRiGUEZ, EvmENcE FOR TRIAL LAWVYERs 9 (1987).
267 See N.J.R.E. 105.
268 Id.
269 The federal rule mentions the word "court," as opposed to "judge" in New
Jersey Rule 105, which preserved the language of the former Rule 4. FED. R. EVm. 105
cmt.
270 N.J.R.E. 105.
271 SeeN.J. CT. R. 2:10-2; see also The Report, supranote 146, at 12 (citing N.J.R.E. 105
cmt.) (commenting that "[t]he trialjudge should give a limiting instruction sua sponte
where it appears necessary to avoid the potential for prejudice."). The problem
arises, however, when the trial judge is "too quick" in issuing a limiting instruction sua
sponte because the lawyer may assert, on appeal, that the trial judge impinged upon
the lawyer's right to forego a limiting instruction. SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note
194, at 36. To alleviate this dilemma, the trial judge may generate a record clearly
stating the reasons for his refusal to issue limiting instructions, thus minimizing the
risk of being overturned on appeal. Id.
If the opposing counsel fails to object to improper limiting instructions, the court
retains the authority to reverse the result based on a "plain error ... 'clearly capable
of producing an unjust result.'" State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 341, 605 A.2d 230, 236
(1992) (quotations omitted). Generally, a reversal based on plain error requires that
"the error committed so affects substantial rights as to induce the reviewing court to
reject the result at trial in spite of the fact that since the proper objection or offer of
proof was not made, strict adherence to the adversary system would require affirmance." Michael H. Graham, Evidence and TrialAdvocacy Workshop The Effect on Appeal of
Error Committed at TrialReversible, Harmless, and Plain Error, 18 CRIM. L. BuLL. 50, 54
(1982).
272 See Limiting Instructions, supra note 8, at 26.
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The judge, however, may question the attorney about the basis for not
petitioning for a limiting instruction, thus alleviating the burden on
the party against whom the evidence is offered. 73 If the attorney continues to refuse the limiting instructions, he or she is then precluded
from asserting plain error on appeal.2 7 4
Conversely, failure to issue a requested limiting instruction constitutes error.2 7 5 Failure to issue limiting instructions, however, may
be reviewed only if such failure constitutes plain error. 276 According
to the federal rules, if counsel fails to request limiting instructions and
the trial court does not ascertain the attorney's intent in so doing,
failure to issue the limiting instructions could be deemed plain error. 277 In contrast, newly enacted NewJersey Rule 105 appears to or-

der an instruction notwithstanding the parties' failure to request
one.

27 8

Pursuant to NewJersey's newly adopted rules, the process of issuing limiting instructions will again plunge the state's courts and practitioners into another area where the federal rules are plagued with
ambiguity.2 7 9 For example, newly enacted Rule 105 does not specify
what constitutes a proper request for limiting instructions. 2 0 Trial
courts, therefore, would have no guidance in assessing the propriety
of a request for limiting instructions.2 81
273 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 266, at 9. Nonetheless, the trial court's issuance of the
limiting instructions in spite of the attorney's objections would not be regarded as
error. Id. Prevalently, where one party seeks a limiting instruction that is challenged
by another party to the action, courts tend to issue the requested limiting instruction.
Id.
274 Instructions,supra note 7, at 153.
275 Id. at 149.

276 NJ. CT. R. 2:10-2. See also The Report, supra note 146, at 12 (citing NJ.R.E. 105
cmt.) (noting that absent a request for limiting instructions, the failure to do so will
be reviewed as plain error).
277 Instructions,supra note 7, at 153. To ascertain what would constitute plain error
is, however, a complicated matter. Id. The reported decisions under the Federal
Rules of Evidence are inconsistent and do not provide clear guidance. Id.
278 See N.J.R.E. 105. Interestingly, the only difference between the first sentence of
former New Jersey Rule 6 and New Jersey Rule of Evidence 105 is that the new rule
requires that a request for a limiting instruction be made. Id. cmt.
279 See SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 194, at 36 (criticizing Federal Rule 105 for

its ambiguity with respect to Rules 403 and 103(a) (1) and (2)).
280 See N.J.R.E. 105.
281 Id. For example, failure to include a New Jersey rule analogous to the FED. R.
Evm. 103 sections (a) (1) and (2) may create confusion as to the types of errors that
would mandate reversal. See FED. R. Evm. 103 (requiring specific objections or a rational and unequivocal offer of proof when making a ruling to admit or exclude evidence). Practicing attorneys are bound not only to request what is legally right, but
also to "seek to illuminate all concerns for the Court and to suggest appropriate actions." SALTZBURG & REDDEN, supra note 194, at 36. Nevertheless, the Botter Committee's recommendations did not add a rule covering the principles in Federal Rule 103
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Additionally, New Jersey Rule 105 confers upon parties the right
to expressly waive limiting instructions.2 8 2 Thus, mere failure to request a limiting instruction would not operate as a waiver under this
rule. 28 3 The Botter Committee justified this waiver provision as being
necessary for tactical reasons, such as to "avoid emphasizing particular
evidence." 28 4 Prosecutors typically overemphasize the probative 2value
8 5 If
of other-crimes evidence, primarily in their closing statements.
the defendant expressly waives a limiting instruction, the jury will have
no guidance in assessing the purpose for offering the other-crimes
exacerbating the danger of prejudice to the
evidence, thus
28 6
defendant.
The outcome of a criminal case often rests predominantly on the
procedures governing the admissibility of evidence and the trial
because such evidentiary principles have already been codified in New Jersey Court
Rules 1:7-2, 1:7-3 and 2:10-2. See The Rep" supra note 146, at 11. As a practical matter, however, the rules on objections and plain error should all be in one place with
the rest of the rules of evidence. See Imwinkelried, Need To Amend, supra note 2, at
1494 (citation omitted) (stating that "a codification should 'furnish answers to most
and perhaps all the questions likely to arise in connection with its matter'").
282 NJ.RE. 105(b). The second part of the rule, inexplicably referred to by the
comments as the second sentence of a one-sentence rule, is derived from neither the
federal nor the New Jersey rules. The Report, supra note 146, at 12. The Botter Committee explained the addition of this provision by noting that waiving limiting instructions must be done expressly. Id. This waiver provision is problematic in that while
the newly enacted rule intends to grant broad protections in limiting the inferences
that may be drawn from other-crimes evidence, the protections are really conditional.
Williams.J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights In CriminalProcedure, 75 VA. L. REv. 761, 763 (1989).
283 See N.J.R.E. 105 cmt.
284 The Report, supra note 146, at 12. The need to avoid particular evidence under
the Rule 105 waiver provision may occur when the defendant's other crimes are advanced in the prosecutor's case-in-chief, and as the trial progresses, the probative
worth of the defendant's other crimes is not exploited by the prosecutor. Limiting
Instructions,supra note 8, at 26. The defendant may then waive a limiting instruction
so that the jury is not reminded of this highly prejudicial evidence. Id. Conversely, if
an inexperienced litigator waives the right to a limiting instruction regarding othercrimes evidence, the jury will lack any guidance on how to evaluate the defendant's
other crimes. See Id.
The addition of this provision, however, seems unnecessary in view of the requirement that parties must request limiting instructions. NJ.R.E. 105. Technically,
failure to request a limiting instruction operates as a waiver unless there is a great
potential for prejudice and the trial judge decides to issue limiting instructions sua
sponte. See id. cmt.
Frequently, prosecutorial misconduct occurs after the introduction of a defendant's other crimes, exacerbating the danger of prejudice for criminal defendants. See
State v. Eason, 138 N.J. Super. 249, 257-59, 350 A.2d 506, 510-11 (App. Div. 1975)
(reversing a conviction because the prosecutor uttered highly prejudicial statements
pertaining to the defendant's other crimes during the prosecutor's closing
statements).
285 Limiting Instructions, supra note 8, at 26-27.
286 Id. at 26.

1993]

COMMENT

445

judge's limiting instructions.28 7 These two factors are of such importance that they have been described as establishing "the difference
between giving defendants a fair trial or not."2 8 Moreover, the availability and effectiveness of issuing limiting instructions is relevant in
determining whether to exclude evidence for unfair prejudice under
Rule 403.289

Most often, however, jurors fail to comprehend the limited purpose for which the other-crimes evidence is offered. 2 1 As Justice
Stein pointed out in State v. Stevens,"91 newly enacted Rule 105 will not
rectify the problem that jurors are unable to limit the scope of inferences that may be drawn from other-crimes evidence. 29 2 Moreover, in
view of the lack of procedural safeguards in the newly adopted rules,
this problem will persist because jurors are predisposed to convict
once a defendant's other crimes are introduced at trial. 29 - Rather
than resolving problems in the application of former Rule 55, the
newly adopted New Jersey Rule 105 has laid ground for new substantive problems.

29 4

CONCLUSION

The adoption of rules governing the admissibility of evidence
in criminal trials should foster predictability and precision. The
recent adoption of NewJersey Rule 404(b), however, seems to contravene the logical evolution of the laws of evidence in the State of
New Jersey by abrogating one hundred and eighty three years of
efforts to develop a cogent other-crimes jurisprudence. 295 Under
the newly adopted other-crimes rule, mass disorientation will
predominate because of the unsettled status of the role played by
the NewJersey common law. 296 The true repercussions of the New
287

Ordover, supra note 137, at 136.

288 Id.
289 FED. R EvID. 105 advisory committee's note. For instance, the proponent of the
evidence may recommend that the court disregard the adverse impact of other-crimes
evidence by issuing a limiting instruction. WEISSENBERGER, supra note 248, at 25. On
the other hand, an opponent to the evidence must be prepared to solicit a limiting
instruction in case his request to exclude the evidence is denied. Id.
290 See Instructions, supra note 7, at 149.
291 115 N.J. 289, 558 A.2d 833 (1989). In Stevens, Justice Stein noted that understanding the need to comply with a limiting instruction is "an extraordinarily difficult
task for the average juror." Id. at 304, 558 A.2d at 841-42 (Stein, J., concurring).
292 See supra note 170 and accompanying text (noting that jurors are unable to distinguish between the permissible and impermissible uses of limiting instructions).
293 See Wake Up, supra note 168, at 1068.
294 Id.
295 State v. Van Houten, 3 NJ.L. 248 (1810).
296 This is clear in that federal courts and New

Jersey courts apply different stan-
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Jersey Rule 404(b) on criminal defendants, however, will only unravel after years of trial and error. New Jersey practitioners should
be wary of the substantive problems that have been created by the
newly adopted rules.
Alma G. Lopez
dards of proof prior to admitting a criminal defendant's other crimes. See supra note
137 (discussing United States v. Huddleston).

